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PREFACE 
This thesis focuses on the role of the United States and its 
citizens during the -operative peried of the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration in China: 1945-47. The obviou13 fact 
emerges that the American people rallied to ,China Y:s aid following the 
I 
close of the Second World War; but it.is also obvious that a loss of 
interest on the part of the American people in general and the refusal 
of Congress in particular to vote appropriations for this humanitarian 
organization led to its premature death. 
For aid on this paper I gratefully acknowledge·the fourth floor 
staff of the University Library and especially the services of the 
Interlibrary Loan Department, for able help in acquiring needed material 
for my study., -Also particular appreciation is extended to Dr. Alfred 
Levin, and Dr~ Homer L •. Knight, who both critically read and willingly 
assisted at all times. 
Sincere gratitude is expressed to Dr. Bidney-D. Brown, who has 
brought to life for me the study of the Far East. His strong encourage-· 
ment, guidance, and advice over the past several months have ma.de it 
possible for me to make completion of this thesis a reality. 
Last, I acknowledge my mother, Erma 1'{I. G0odno, and.sister, Mary 
V. Mittelstet for their encouragement and insistence that I return to 
school for graduate study9 
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CHAPTER I 
. THEHW:ANG :HO·- A WARTIME DISASTER 
The Hwang Ho winds for some 2700 miles across the diversified ter-
rain of Northern China.1 To most Americans the literal translation, 
"Yellow River", would sound more familiar. But the Hwang Ho is known by 
another name, the "Hundred Sorrows" or more commonly as "China's Sorrow," 
to the eighty million Chinese who reside in its drainage basin of 297,905 
square miles. 2 · A study of the Yellow River will reveal that it has 
changed its course many times both in geological and historical times, 
and it is these changes of the lower reaches, in historical times, which 
have brought untold suffering to the Chinese people. 
In 1947, after running amuck for nearly nine years, meandering over 
a broad belt of China's best farmland, the Yellow River again was put 
under control. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Adminis-
tration as.sumed the greater financial burden of harnessing the floods of 
China's most unruly river, and nearly completed the task in little over a 
1GeorgeB. Cressey, Asia's Lands and Peoples, A Geography of One-
Third of.the Earth !!1s! Two-Thirds.of Its People· (New York: McGraw-Hill 
· Book Company, Inc., 1951), P• 55. 
2cressey, land .S?.f-·~ 500 Million, A. Geography of China (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1955), P• 249. 
1 
2 
year. The project had its beginning·in early 1946 and the main flow was 
turned back into its old.course in mid-March .of 1947. The work of cutting 
off seepage and completing waterproofing.of the main division lasted 
. 0 
several weeks. longer. . Mending of the dikes from the original break .to 
the sea-went.on for several ad4itional,months and the project was sub-
. <) 
stantiallycomplete, but the Chinese civil war abruptly· te~ted UNRRA's 
work just short of goals originally established. 
Throughout historic times the existence of the Yellow.River has 
been the great.fact of Chinese ciyilization. The river gave birth to 
the civilization; and the river enabled it to flourish through three 
millenniums. Appropriately the yellow of the silt-laden water became 
the Imperial color; and the river matched Emperors.in.arbitrary behavior 
and unrestrained power over those who lived within.its drainage basin. 
Historically, the middle section of the river is·the most important, for 
it is here among the hills of the loessland that the earliest traces of 
Chinese·civilization are to be.found. In the present day provinces-of 
Shensi and Shansi the neolithic Yangshao and Lungshan cultures (commonly 
referred to as , the Painted Pottery Cul~:ure and the Plack Pottery· Culture 
3 
.respectively) of 4000--3000 B.c. evolved most rapidly into a civilization 
which is-quite recognizably Chinese.in-character. In this same region 
the great Empe;ror·Yu reputedly founded the Hsia dynasty in 2205 B.c.4 
3 
. Nigel Cameron, . "Taming the Ye·llow Dragon (Yellow River)," ~ 
Geographical Magazine, XXXIII (July, 1969), 149. 
4F.d.win o. Reischauer and John K. Fairbank, East.Asia The Great 1!:!,-
ditio:ri (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), p. 38. 
3 
The legend surrounding the Emperor Yu, a culture-hero, tells of his pre-
I. 
paring the land for occupancy by draining the flood waters and confining 
them to the Xellow Rivera lhe Great Xu ruled the Nine Provinces which 
:comprised the China of'his day. The later historic dynasties definitely 
controlled this area., the l;)irth place of a unique Chinese·civilization. 
Far to the·west in the Kunlun Mountains of Eastern Tibet.lie the 
headquarters. of. ,the Yellow River. Here are found a number of lakes, and 
marsh areas, fed by melted snow. The largest of these lakes are Tsaring-
Nor and Oring-Nor, 5 lying at an elevation of over fourteen thousand 
,, 
6 feet. Rising out of these lakes in Tsinghai province of Tibet, the 
Hwang Ho .. crosses the· Chinese province of Kansu as a torrential. stream 
only· seventy-five· feet wide, then swings through the Inner Mongolian 
districts.of Ninghsia. a.ndSuiyuan~7 From there it flows on to form the 
border between Shensi and Shansi provinces. It then continues on through 
the delta provinces of Honan, Hopei, and Shantung to the sea, having 
traversednine provinces. The river flows through most diverse terrain., 
then, out of the rugged highland of Tibet, into the delta of the Yellow 
River. The sediment which the river has·ta.ken from the mountainous 
hinterland. has built up one of the world's great alluvial plains in 
northeastern China. 
5Ferdinand c. Lane, Earth's Grandest Rivers (Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday & Company, Inc.,·1949), p. 60. 
6cr.esseyll ~ .21 the 500 Million, p~ 249. 
7 
Ibid., Asia's Lands .s:!19,. People, p~ 55. 
4 
The known history of the Yellow River is as old as that of China 
itself, going back to the earliest records of some thirty centuries ago. 8 
During this span of time it is possible to count.nearly 1500 floods,9 
which have occurred in the middle anq. lower reaches. Spectacular floods · 
have made milJ.ions homeless and have inundated hundreds of thousands of 
square miles of good farmland, resulting in epidemics and famines as 
their inevitable consequences. During this period the Hwang Ho has 
drastically changed its course at least nine times,10 sometimes flowing 
south of the Shantung Peninsula and sometimes, as it does at the present, 
to the north to empty into the Yellow Sea. 
In 1852 when Great Britain tried to bring pressure on the·Chinese 
Government, the Royal Navy blockaded the mouth of the river, only to find 
11 
that after several months the river had moved 250miles to the north. 
Iri:1938 when the Chinese cut the dikes, in Honan province, to delay the 
invading Japanese, the main flow of water was diverted southeast to the 
Hwai River which served as the main cha"P!lel in 1289 and 1887, 12 and here 
the.river continued to flow until 1947 when the dikes were repaired under 
the supervision of UNRRA. 
8 Cressey, Asia.'s Lands .and Peoples, p. 101. 
9cameron, "Taming the YelJ.ow Dragon (Yellow River)," p. 147. 
10 
Ibid., 
11 Cressey, Asia's Lands and People, P• 103. 
12Ibid •. 
5 
The reasons for the Yellow River's history of ca.larltities are both 
geographic and climatic in nature. As stated above., the river· rises as an 
innocuous.stream, or a s~ries of streams., in the Kunlun Mountains. It 
is during the·spring melting period that the snows of central Asia adu a 
tremendous, sudden., and unpredictable.volume of water to the river's 
headwaters.. · The water moves at great speed through an area :of:. mountain-
ous desert and loess soil whose surface is largely·denuded of any·vege-
tation. At low water., t.he river's .flow may amount to only 5,000 cubic 
feet per second., while in flood periods it has increased to 1.,000.,000.13 
The river's average gradient., in the mountainous area, is some seven feet 
per-mile. Thecombination of the gradient and the condition of the top 
soil produces erosion on a grand scale., as the silt is easily carried and 
comprises a. large percentage of the water's content ... At'.a given point in 
Honan Prov±nce., in the .lower reaches of its course, the amount of silt 
carried .. in suspension exceeds a million cubic yards a year.14 But before 
the water·· reaches this. point., the Hwang Ho has become a menacing race 
whose potentialities can seldom be predicted. The water moves. from its 
source through successive oxbow loops and newly created cutoffs., at times 
lea.ping bodily from its bed to gorge out a new route on its way to the 
sea. At ti:in.es.the·rive:r appears to be a victim of suicide., by allowing 
its bed· to .. fill up with silt; however., this has caused the river bed to 
13 Cressey., Land .Q.f the 500 Million., p. 248. 
14 ' Cameron, "Taming the Yellow Dragon (Yellow River).," P• 149. 
6 
rise above the surface of the surrounding area, making diking mandatory. 
A wall of water, following the spring thaw, has often poured out on the 
rice andcotton growing plains·of northeastern China, which is one of 
·· the world's most densely populated areas. The impetus of the rushing 
water slackens as.the river widens and the gradient levels out and the 
silt is deposited on river bed, which has resulted in a gradual rising 
of the bed. Thus, nearly every year, for some two thousand years the 
peasants of the area have been laboriously adding a few inches to the 
dikes in an effort to contain the onrush of d:i._saster. However, on the 
th H 15 . t average of every two years · e Hwang o has won, pouring ou from the 
weak points in the dikes, onto the helpless and defenseless land and 
people. 
The loess area of north China is an astonishing creation of nature 
and phenomenal in its makeup. There are mountains entirely composed of 
yellow lpess, a stratified silt of yellowish-brown loam or aeolian de-
posit, whose origins are debatable, but which probably blew eastward 
from the deserts of northwestern Asia, shaped and moulded by both the 
work of erosion and man. For hundreds of miles there can be found no 
area of level soil that has not witnessed the ageless struggle between 
peasant and climatic conditions, which has on numerous occasions eroded 
their land from under their feet. Today the landscape is terraced, as 
it has been since the days. of the mythical Yu, by mud embankments around 
15 
Ibid., P• 149. 
each tiny plot of land waiting to be hand plowed, hand sown, and later 
hand reaped. 
7 
These recurring floods, ijO frequent in China's history, have served 
as reminders, to.the Chinese, of the magnitude of control measures neces-
sary to preserve large areas of fertile farmland for cultivation. China, 
in the immediate postwar period, with materials and technical aid from 
the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, started the 
repair work of dikes an!3- conservancy projects, most of which had either 
fallen into. disrepair due· to wartime neglect or had been damaged as a re-
sult of the war. 
By the end· of 1947 a total of eleven flood prevention projects, 
carried out under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Water Conservancy, 
and largely financed by UNRRA were in various stages of progress, some 
nearing completion, while others were in an earlier stage of progress. 
The Yellow River Project received the highest priority and was almost 
completed. 
When the Chinese, hoping to impede the Japanese advance. in 1938, 
breached.the southern dike in Honan Province, they intended only to flood 
a small area of the surrounding·countryside. But they found the "Hundred 
Sorrows" could not be controlled. To the military mind this zn.ove·proved 
successful. However, the wa,ters, swollen with late spring rains, not 
only formed a. barrier which the Japanese could not cross, but inflicted 
untold suffering on the Chinese peasants. The results to them were 
catastrophic. The wall of water burst through the-opening in the dike, 
making_ a gap some five thousand feet. wide and flooding some two mill.ion 
8 
acres of fertile farnhand. With the ~ssing of time the breach continued 
.to widen., The wall of water caught. the peasants by surprise a:nd·.without 
warning. Some 406.,660 people were drowned and nearly a ~llion homes 
swept away. In areas where the water stood only a few feet deep the 
population found spots of higher ground to which they fled, while in 
other places the depth forced the people to escape by climbing to the tops 
of houses or trees. Within a few days after the breach at least three 
million peasants were caught in the flood's path in Honan Province alone. 
Accurate statistics do not exist concerning the full extent of the damage. 
However., in addition.to the estimated quarter of a million persons who 
were drowned in Honan Province, some three times this number were reported 
to have died of diseases or starvation.16 
Thus, once again the Hwang-Ho. found its way to the Yellow Sea along 
its old southern course and continued periodically to flood the country-
side. However, China's ever increasing population virtually demanded that 
every available acre of cultivatable land be used; therefore some 250.,000 
. ' . 
peasants moved in and began to cultivate the old bed of the Hwang-Ho. 
Flooding, possible starvation., disease., all menaced them continuously., 
but they remained there until UNRRA., in 1946., nioved to reroute the Hwang 
Ho and to restore life to the devastated villages in_.Honan, Anhwei., and 
Kiangsu Provinces. 
16
"The Mouth of the Yellow River Moved 250 Miles: China's Sorrow 
·Harnessed as an U.,Nf>R<>R.,AciL-;i£/ Project.," Illustrated London News, June 
?, 1947, P• 592; Rayniond Moyer, "Current Conditions in Postwar Honan.," 
Far Eastern Survey, XV (~une 17, 1946), P• 219. 
CHAPTER II 
AN ORGAN FOR PEACE - UNRRA 
The sweeping destruction and derangement imposed by the Japanese in 
China were of such a nature that only foreign aid for relief and reha-
bilitation purposes could save the invaded-nation fr0m complete chaos. 
The total areas occupied by the Japanese in China.approximately equalled 
those overrun by the Axis Power.a in Europe. However, the population di-
rectly affected by the occupation was much larger and the period of sub-
mission more extended •. 
A disaster of such proportions aroused traditional American humani-
tarian sentiment. On July 23, 1942, spe~ing to the American people by 
·radio, the Secretary of State Cordell Hull said: ''With victory achieved 
our first concern must be for those whose sufferings have been almost 
beyond human endurance •••• Unknown millions will be far from their homes 
••• refugees.from battle, from.cruelty, from starvation. Disease and 
danger of disease wili lurk everywhere •••• v~ctory must be followed by 
1 
swift and effective action to meet, these pressing needs." To answer 
and meet these needs.the future United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration was created. Thus the idea of international cooperation 
1
.AndrewBoyd, The United Nations Organization Handbook (New York: 
Pila,t Press Inc., ·1946), P• 102. 
in the restoration of postwar economic and social stability in war-torn 
countries antedated by some years the conclusion of the Second Wbrld War. 
Prior to the United States' sntrande into the war, British states-
men voiced an opinion concerning the need for a noble, postwar relief 
plan. Dur:ing August of 1940 Prime Minister Churchill spoke before the 
British House of Commons, and pledged to the people of Europe that when 
the Nazi power was broken, they should have food, freedom, and peace. 
To fulfill this pledge, a little more than a year later, in September, 
1941., representatives of the Allied Governments,:. excluding the United 
States, met at St. James's Palace., Governments represented included 
Urea'\; Britain and the Dominions, Soviet Russia, the Governments-in-Exile, 
and the representatives of General de Gaulle. 2 Here they set up the 
Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements, which would carry out 
-the decisions of the conference. The participating governments declared 
their adherence to the Atlantic Charter, as announced by President 
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. Further, the representatives 
approved, with the exception of Soviet Russia, a six-point resolution 
concerning postwar rehabilitation. In essence the resolution provided: 
"although each government was 'primariJ.¥ responsible for making provision 
for the economic needs of its own people,' the governments concerned 
proposed to coordinate their plans 'in a spirit of inter-allied col-
laboration.;rn3 Under the Chairmanship of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, a 
~ational Planning Association, UNRRA: Gateway to Recovery, Planning 
Pamphlets No~ 30-31 (Washington, D~C,: National Planning Association, 
1944), P• 61 .. 
3Ibid. 
.11 
noted and long't-time chief economic adviser to the British Government and 
later a DepµtyDirector General of UNRRA, the Inter-Allied Connnittee on 
Post-War Requirements would coordinate the program and relationships 
among the adhering nations. In addition, the Connnittee "would also set 
up and supervise a Bureau of Post-War Requirements 'with which the Allied 
Governments and authorities would col~porate in gaining estimates of 
,! ' 
their requirements.'"4 
The conference overruled the Soviet Government's objection to an 
exclusively British secretariat and established the Bureau of Post-War 
Requirements. Then the connnittee sta.rted to work on plans for relief 
activities. The Bureau maintained close communi"C:ations with Washington.5 
In December, 1941, Pearl Harbor reversed the whole American attitude 
toward relations with the allied powers, and the United States joined 
6 
the Inter-Allied Connnittee. To this point only an observer had repre-
sented the United States. The following December, 1942, the President 
of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt, created the Office of"~ Foreign 
Relief and Rehaqilitation Operations within the State Department. The 
former Governor of New York, Herbert H. Lehman, later the first Director 
General of UNRRA, headed the OFRRO upon its establishment. The business 
of OFRRO centered around the making.of provisions and preparations for 
4Ibid., P• 61. 
5Ibid. 
6 
Boyd,~ United Nations Organization Handbook, P• 109. 
:12 
relief of war victims in liberated areas. Upon taking office the OFRRO 
Director declared that administering of relief was a world-wide problem 
and not solely the responsibility of the United States, or a select.few 
nations which suffered less because they had not been successfully in-
vaded.7· 
During the spring of 1943 Governor Lehman visited London, and he 
began working out a basis for discussion with the other Allied Nations 
for a world-wide relief program. The results of this meeting were not 
made known to the world until late May, 1943. On May 18, 1943, a United 
Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture·convened at Hot Springs, 
Virginia, and after termination of its discussion on more permanent as-
pects of applying the doctrine of "freedom from want," the world received 
8 
the news.ct the future UNRRA. 
The initial draft of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration was published during 1une, 1943, by the United States 
Department of State with the ·concurrence of the Governments of the 
United States, China, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. The second 
draft, which embodied several amendments proposed by various govern-
ments and certain influential members of the United States Congress was 
released on September 23, 1943. Out of the final amendments came UNRRA., 
of November, 1943, to which forty-eight nations eventually attached 
7National Planning Association., UNRRA, P• 62. · 
8:soyd., The United Nations Organization Handbook, .. pp. 111-114. 
l3 
themselves. 9 
China officially became a member of the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administratli.on on Novemb.er 9, 1943. Forty-four nations 
were represented at the White House, Washington, D. c~, for a formal 
signing of the UNRRA agreement. The following day the first Council 
session met in Atlantic City, New Jersey. 
When President Roosevelt established ~he Office of Foreign Relief 
and Rehabilitation Operations, he stated offi9ially t~t Herbert H. 
Lehman, "would, in association with the State Department, 'undertake the 
work of organizing American participation in the activities of the 
United Nations in .furnishing relief and other asf!istanee to the victims 
of war in areas reoccupied by the .forces of the United Nations.tnlO From 
this. time on it was generally understood and agreed by the Allied Powers 
.that Governor Lehman would be the .future Director General o.f UNRRA. How-
ever, Lehman was not responsible .for negotiating the United Nations Agree-
ment; this remained a .function o.f the State Department. 
On November 10, 1943, representatives. o.f the .forty-four .founding . 
nations meeting as the .first Council in Atlantic City, unanimously 
elected Governor Herbert H •. Lehman the .first Director General. He con-
tinued in this capacity until the spring of 1946, at which time he re-
tired because o.f ill health, .and'. was succe.eded by Fiorella La Guardia, 
9National Planning Association, UNRRA,:.PP• J:-.2. 
10 
.mg., P• 62. 
the "Little Flower" and former mayor of New York City. P. W. Kuo, 
Chinese Vice-Minister of Finance, was selected to serve as a Deputy Di-
rector General of the administration. 
The Council, UNRRA's controlling body on which each member nation 
had one representative, made its decisions by a simple majority. At its 
first meeting the Council provided for the establishment of two regional 
committees, one for Europe and the other for the Far F.ast. Dr. T. F. 
Tsiang, then Director of Political Affairs in the Executive Yuan, and the 
chief Chinese delegate to the Council, was elected to head the Far 
11 
Eastern Committee. 
The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration was 
created specifically to deal with emergency problems during the remaining 
period o.f the war and during the period of transition from war to peace. 
It was planned as a temporary creation with the expectation that its work 
in Europe would be concluded by the end of 1946, and in the Far East by 
early 1947. UNRRA's fundamental purpose, as its name suggests, was to 
administer relief and to rehabilitate, and as such, it hoped to relieve 
as much suffering as possible in the world, during this transition 
period, and save as many lives as possible. The task undertaken by UNRRA 
differed from all other previous relief and rehabilitation programs as 
it was the first United Nations organization whose specific purpose was 
llChinese Ministry of Information, China Handbook 1937-1945, ~ 
Comprehensive Survey of Major Development in China in Eight Years.·'of 
War (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), p. 538. 
:15 
to plan for readjustments essential for creating peace. The extent of 
its activities were almost global in nature, and the experience gained 
through the activities of this relief and rehabilitation program served 
as the basis for the establishment of permanent agencies, within the 
United Nations, to further alleviate human suffering. Even though 
emergency problems involving relief and rehabilitation preoccupied UNRRA 
leaders much of the time they realized .early that th.e supply and distri-
bution of materials required the reconstruction and rehabilitation of 
public utilities, transportation facilities, and other public services 
which would be of more permanent value. 
During the spring of 1944, the Chinese Government created the 
Chinese Commission on the Investigation and Planning of Relief and Reha-
bilitation to determine postwar needs of China and plan for the relief 
and rehabilitation activities which the country would require. This 
commission included technicians from the ·ministries of Communications, 
Agriculture, and Economic Affairs, Social Affairs, Finance, and Food, 
as well as the National Health Administration.12 Dr. Tsiang received 
the appointment to serve as chairman of the commission. Y. c .. Koo, 
Vice-Minister of Finance and the Ms.naging Director of the Farmers Bank, 
was appointed Vice-Chairman of the commission and also acting chairman, 
because of Dr. Tsiang's duties with the Far Eastern Regional Committee.13 
The China Government requested the Director General of UNRRA, 
12Ibid., P• 538. 
13Ibid., P• 539. 
Herbert H. Lehman, to appoint three experts as consultants to the in-
vestigating committee, to expedite the complicated task of manning its 
plans and estimating its relief and rehabilitation needs. Specifically 
the government requested an economist, an agricultural expert, and a 
public health expert. UNRRA Headquarters answered by sending Mr. Owen 
L. Lawson as the agricultural expert, Eugene Staley as the economist, 
and by arranging for Dr. John B. Grant, a public health specialist working 
with the Rockefeller Foundation in India, to contribute his services.14 
Mr. Staley, formerly a professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Di-
plomacy, and Mr. Owen L. Dawson, an agricultural expert, served in China, 
in the capacity of technical advisers, from April tc:i' July of 1944. Dr. 
Grant came from Calcutta, India for several weeks during the connnission's 
t . 15 opera ions. 
The two experts spent most of their time in Chungking, working with 
th · · ' · b ·tt 16 e comnu.ssion s various su comIIll. ees. These subcommittees closely 
paralleled the subheadings of the UNRRA organization, with the exception 
of the Flooded Areas Rehabilitation subcommittee, as flooding was a 
problem more peculiar to China than the other war torn countries assisted 
by UNRRA. While working with the subcommittees the two men also visited 
14.Eugene Staley, "Relief and Rehabilitation in China," Far Eastern 
Survey, XIII (October 4, 1944), P• 183. 
15Ibid. 
16The Commission's subcommittees consisted of: Food, Clothing and 
Textiles, Health and Medical Care, Transport and Communications Reha-
bilitation, Agricultural Rehabilitation, Industrial Rehabilitation, 
Welfare Services, Displaced Persons, and Flooded Areas Rehabilitation; , 
Ibid. 
17 
various public institutions, industrial and agricultural plants .and 
training institutions for personnel in related fields . to relief and reha-
bilitation. On returning to the United States they carried with them 
the preliminary reports of the commi·ssion:' s nine subcommittees, which 
served as the basis for the overall report prepared by the Chinese of-
ficials on postwar ·relief and rehabilitation needs, and which they sub-
mitted to UNRRA Headquarters.17 
Mr. Staley, upon completing the Chinese study, found the Chinese 
working on the various problems in hearty agreement with the basic aim 
·-
of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. That 
aim was: to help people to help themselves. He found that the Chinese 
officials did not expect their postwar needs to be met primarily by ship-
ments of imported goods, even if it were physically possible, but that 
they believed t~eir greatest need would be in the forms of technical 
help and assistance. They realized that the technical help and as-
sistance, obtained from the United Nations in trained people, could and 
would train Chinese relief and rehabilitation workers. Supplies, tools, 
and equipment would help to meet the great problems of human distress 
that existed in the invaded areas, and would put China's disrupted tranr 
sportation, communications, agriculture, and industries on their way to 
18 
recovery. 
The key to postwar relief and rehabilitation in the occupied pa.rt 
l?Ibid., PP• 183-184. 
18 
Ibid., P• 184. 
18 
of China, according to Staley, was the prompt restoration of transpor~ 
tation: systems. He placed inland waterways and highway tran~portation 
first and then the restoration of railway transportation as second in 
importance. Engines were badly needed for the locally built river boats 
and barges, which could be used to haul heavy goods cheaply and quickly. 
All of China's railways needed extensive repair, and time: was needed to 
restore them. The number of trucks in the country was extremely small 
and badly in need of repairs which were not available. Not only were 
engines and propellers, trucks, tools and spare parts needed; there also 
existed a desperate need for personnel from abroad to give the Chinese 
the necessary technical assistance and training.19 
The tentative estimate made by the Chinese Commission on the In-
vestigation and Planning Relief and Rehabilitation proved too great to 
present to UNRRA. The commission, after due deliberation with all 
parties concerned, decided to divide the program into two parts, one 
part to b.e financed by UNRRA and the other by China herself... . mm.RA' s 
part wa.s ·s.et at US$945,196,ooo. 20 The Program and Estimated Require-
ments for Relief and Rehabilitation in China, a voluminous do~ument, 
was formally t;t'ansmitted to UNRRA ',s Director General on September 30, 
21 
1944. Ea:t'ly ,in 1945 the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administ;t'ation, working with other agencies of the Chine·se Government 
19 
Ibid., P• 18,4. 
20ch· Min" t f Inf t · Ch. H db k 1937 1945 538 J.nese is J.'Y o orma. .a.on, _rn an oo ~ -, p. • 
21Ibid., P• 539. 
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and UNRRA representative-s, began to formulate, from the tentative -esti-
mates, a formal request to UNRRA, the purpose being to initiate procure-
ment for the first major port.ion of the p;r-ogram in China. 
At the -Seceond Council helli in Mon~real in Sept.emb~r, 1944, the 
China representative stressed the differenc.es between his country and 
those of Europe, concerning approaches used by UNRRA. Dr. Tsiang re-
lated to the Council that he was happy to b,e in a position to report tha. t 
so far as China's position was '.Con-cerned there was no fog concerning 
UNRRA. He pointed out that in spite of the fact that few UNRRA a.ctivities 
coulo. be seen in China, the Chinese understood the difficulties in the 
way, and that these were beyond the ~ontrol of the administration. He 
further mentioned that during the first year of UNRRA it had done only 
two things involving China. Its technical consultants had begun to co-
operate with the Chinese Government in planning postwar relief and .reha-
bilitation; and UNRRA had sponsored the training of a number of Chinese 
technicians in the United Stat.es. He stated tha. t these activitie's of 
the past month were understood and accepted even though they were not 
large , because they, could not have been larger. Tsiang continued, how-
ever, by ob,serving that he had two hopes for the future. First, he 
hope4 that the Council would examine and give some attention to the es-
sential differences betwe·en the Far East ano. Europe. Mr. Tsiang con-
cluded his remarks with the statement .that "while I am ready to stand by 
the Resolutions of ·the Council and the Agreement, I suggest to the Di-
rector General that we approach the Far East problem realistically. We 
20 
should not ,follow the European pattern slavishly •••• Europe is a mucp 
smaller region than the Far East as def?-Tied by the Agreement and the Reso-
lutions. And within the region there is much less homogeneity than in 
Europe.n22 
The Co,uncil acknowledged that it had achieved few things during its 
formative period; but during this Second Council meeting it did announce 
the coming establishment of two Far Eastern offices, one to be lo:cated at 
Sydney and the other in Chungking. · 
Before the Third Council closed in London the Allies had defeated 
the Japanese in the Far East. The Council recognized that their greatest 
task in China still lay ahead of them. 
Dur.ing the Fourth Council of March, 1946, ex-Governor Lehman's resig-
nation was accepted and his successor appointed. Mr. Lehman in his final 
report to the Council pointed out the seriousness of the world shortage of 
food and the problem of displaced persons not prepared to .retµrn to their 
homes. He stressed the points learned by UNRRA in the fielo. of relief and 
rehabilitation, emphasizing the great work yet undone, and lamenting that 
the ,end of UNRRA was in sight; yet, with so much to be done. He continued: 
We have not been frightened of political dramas. w~ 
were realistic enough to recognize that our problems some-
times touched political interests. I think, I am justified 
in saying, however, that UNRRA has successfully refused even 
to allow political interests to influence its judgments, its 
determinations, or its wo,rk •••• UNRRA has shown beyond any 
22United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Journal 
Se.cond Session ~ Related Documents of the First Session (Montreal, 
Canada, September 15 to 27, 1944), PP• 48-49. 
rloubt that men and nations can work together, can live together, 
can -develop an und~rstanding of each other's problems •••• This 
very seseion, which is now coming to an end, has shown that 48 
nations can sit around a table, can honestly and fearlessly and 
without pulling any punches, discuss their problems and seek to 
work out a solution .... We have demonstrated that there is hope 
in international cooperation, a hope that I am confident, if 
properly developed, will lead to security and lasting peace.23 
The retiring Director General received due tribute from various 
21 
membe.rs of the Council. Then Mr. William L. Clayton, United States repre-
sentative to the Council, read a letter from the President of the United 
States, to Mr. Lehman, dated March 25, 1946: 
'Under your guidance ••• the practical concept of mo-
bilizing resources of food, clothing, medicines and other 
necessities to aid the victims of ·war proadened from : 
one of nat.ional scope to one of joint responsibility of 
the United Nations •••• Under the trying limitations of your 
supply and distribution imposed by the war, you laid the 
foundation for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration and prepared the structure of international 
coopera t -ion which now is bringing effective aid to millions 
of our liberated allies •••• the wo,rld ••• no less than those 
receiving UNRRA aid, will be grateful to you for your part 
in making possible this collaboration in the interest of 
lasting peace. 
Very sincerely yours, 
/s/ Harry s. Truman. ,24 
Fiorello H11 La, Guardia, :.Former mayor of New York C.ity, on March 29, 
1946, accepted th~ leadership within UNRRA by becoming its second Director 
23united Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, ~ournal 
Fourth Session of the Council and RelatedL Documents of the Fourth Session 
(Atlantic City,New Jersey 15 to 30 March 1946; Washington D• c. 9 May 
1946), PP• 126-127. 
Z4 . Ib,id., P• 122. 
General. !{r. La Guardia's opening address to .the Council contained all 
of ·the punch of the "Little Flower." He explained to the Council that he 
was not a diplomat: "I am going to talk very frankly with you. I hope 
you will understand that I am not a diplomat and am not used to the 
language of diplomacy. When I have something to say I will say it. So, 
from this . point on, the . protocol is df'f." He de·scribed his task as: "to 
take food where we can find it and bring it to the people who are in need, 
wherever they may be." His second task was: "the health problem: to pre-
vent epidemics, to control such epidemics as have started, and to maintain 
the general public health in countries where it is threatened." And the 
third task he saw as: "aiding, wherever needed, in getting people reha-
bilitated so as to be self-sustaining.02:5 Dramatizing the need for im-
mediate and di:r'ect action, the new Director General continued: "It is food 
that we need. The people ar€ crying for bread, not advice. I want pl ows, 
not typewriters. The people need relief, not sympathy. I want fast-moving 
ships, not slow-reading resolutions. People ,cannot eat resolutions, and 
even the peopl e in OtU' country have lea:rned through a period of depressi on 
that 'ticker tape ain't spaghettil rn26 
The Nation, commenting on UNRRA's new chief, sa:td: "The dynamic at-
tack by Fi orello La Guardia on the tasks facing UNRRA must have sent a 
tremor through the creaking joints of that unwielding :organization. If one 
25Ib .'d 
--L•, PP• 128- 129. 
P• 129. 
man can make it operate anything like ·the efficiency t .he terrible situation 
calls for, that: man is La Guardia." The author of the article pointed out 
that this was said "without suggesting any criticism of Governo.r Lehman, 
who contributed energy, organizing ability, and diplomatic skill to the up-
building of UNRRA. 0 ''We need," the article declared, "high-powered drive, 
a determination to cut red tape into confetti and save· lives. We need a 
touch of drama. We need a little ferocity. All in all, we need New York's 
recent Mayor, and I am glad he has, for the duration of hunger, abandoned 
the typewriter for the meat-ax."27 
Mr. La Guardia's acceptance speech to the Council called for greater 
international serYice: 
The American people are kindly. They would not want to 
see mass suffering. I am sure they will respond i.f we can 
get all of the facts to them. And I now swallow my p;dde, 
and this is difficult for me to do, and ask the newspapers 
for their fulJ. and complete cooperation ••• I cannot help re-
peatang again: this is all so new; it is all so hopeful. 
Have ever before in the history of the entire world 48 na.tions 
come together to save lives? We a.I'e united to preserve life, 
to build, not to kill, not to destroy. There is precedent 
for the spirit of 1JNREA in the Old Scripture, in the New 
Scripture: to love our neighbor, to aid the needy-that is not 
original. It just has not been carried out. As the sun moves 
from place to place, there is one continuous prayer to God 
asking for His heavenly kingdom to come to ·earth. In every 
land, in every dialect which is spoken by man, the prayer is 
spoken: Give us this day our daily bread. Our task is to re-
spond to that prayer. We then become a great army of mercy, 
a great army carrying out God Almighty's response to the call 
for daily bread. I refuse to be stopped by pettiness, greed 
27 .. Freda Kirchwey, "Here and The'I'e - UNRRA's New Chief," The Nation, 
CLX:II (April 6, 19 46) , 3 89 -. 
or selfishness. That is the mission of UNRIµ and that .is 
the army I am willing to . lead.28 
The Fifth ,Council convened in Geneva during August, 1946. It 
. started to sound the dea.th knell of an international effort. The Director 
General pointed out that .the emergency task was over, but the need for 
UNR,RA was not. Provisions had not been ·ma.de for UN,RRA's continuance in 
1947. Forty-one per cent of UNRRA's entire cqIIIIIlitments had not been de-
livered to the receiving countries. Mr. La Guardia reviewed the problems 
yet unsolved by UNRRA, then submitted his first plans for the demobiliza-
tion of UNRRA, and at .which time he requested to be relieved of his duties 
as Directo.r General as .soon as arrangements had been made for the com-
29 
pletion of procurement. 
The Sixth and l&st Session of the Council met in Washington, D. c. 
in December, 1946. The Director General reported that seventy-four per 
cent of UNRRA' s prog.rams had been fulfilled and the administration was 
bound to complete ·the remainder as approved by the Central Committee. 
Shipments to China throu,gh Nqvember 30, 1946, . in dollar value amount.ad to 
$229,104,000, only forty-three per cent of UN,RRA's commitments to China.JO 
The Director General informed the Council that the functions and funds of 
28 
George Wo,odbridge, UNRRA The History of the United Nations Re-
lief and Rehabilitation Administration (New York; Columbia University 
Press,- 1950, three volumes), I, 45; UN:RRA, Journal Fourth Council, p. 121-
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29united Nations Relief and Rehabilit.ation Administration, .Journal 
Sixth Session of~ Council and Re4ted Documents of~ Sixth Session 
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JOibid., P• 16. 
UNRRA would be transferred to. -other international organizations and the 
arrangements fo.r the completion of the industrial rehabilitation program.31 
Mr. La Guardia's farewell message to the Council restated his faith in 
international co-operation: 
We have ,carried out a plan drawn up by economists and 
drafted by lawyers, but we did it in the spirit o! the Sermon 
on the Mount. I hope that. Rothing will happen during the re-
maining days of umm.A, or· during the years that are to come, 
that will spoil that .effort. We have -demonstrated to the 
world that .forty-eight nations ca.n work in harmony, that 
forty-eight nations, bent upon good, can ,carry out a great 
, miss.ion. Let , Rot . that be lost to history.3'2 
The :resignation ·of 'Fiorello H. La Guardia became effective on 
December 31, 1946. Major General Lowell w. ~ooks, the Director General 
elect, took office on January 1, 1947. 
When China was finally liberated from the scourge of Japanese 
occupation, its problems and needs for relief and rehabilitation were as 
great, if not greater, than any other country aided by UNRRA. At the 
height of occupation over 200 million Chinese lived in the enemy occupied 
zone or partial occupied zones. In a.ddition, many millions of refugees 
had fled south and west previous to the occupation. During the flight of 
the rePllgees, as well as the retreat of the National Army, great damage 
was done to ,real property and public utilities such as transportation 
facilities. Agriculture and industries were seriously disrupted in many 
regions of th~ north. Economic life had come to an almost complete stand-
still during the nine years of Japanese occupation. When the Japanese were 
32Ibid., P• 50; UNRRA, Journal Sixth Council, P• 21. 
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finally driven out many regions were still more seriously effected. 
Over large parts of Asia the situation was desperate, perhaps much 
more so than in Europe, at the close of the war. China's crop faillU'e of 
1946 added to .the already desperate conditions. Estimates were made that 
nearly 400 million people were on the verge of starvation in Asia. 
In carrying out its humane mission UNRRA spent during its short 
duration over four billion dollars. Of this sum the United States con-
tributed so1!1.B two and three-fourths billions..33 The United States Army 
fed during the latter years of the war large areas of occupied Europe, as 
well as areas not occupied in China. In addition lend-lease continued to 
pour foodstuff and other need~d supplies into European and Asiatic Allied 
countries, until it was abruptly terminated in August, 1945, only one 
week after the capitulation of Japan. Private gifts and CARE, however, 
supplemented governmental contributions on a generous scale. 
UNRRA almost inevitably got mixed up in politics. And it was with 
some truth that the charge was made that American supplies were being 
used to bolster Communist regimes abroad. The original UNRRA Agreement 
stipulated that political belief would not be considered in the distri-
bution of relief supplies. Large amounts of foodstuff and other relief 
supplies were turned over to the Communists in North China, in order that 
the Communists might complete their portion of the Yellow Rive~ Project. 
Partly for this reason, partly because inadequate appropriations made for 
33UNRRA1 Journal Sixth Council, P• 16. 
inefficiency of administration and partly because. of the widespread feeling 
that.the crisis was ended, Congress lost enthusiasm for UNRRA and allowed 
it to.die in 1947. 
If the United States did much for relief in China and other areas 
in dire need, she did much less than her resources permitted, as there 
was no postwar rationing. In many cases we continued to feed our cereal 
grains to,our livestock.rather than export them directly to the starving 
abroad. 
CHAPTER III 
CNRRA - UNRRA'S CHINA COLLEAGUE 
The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration oper-
ated on the premise that it might win final victory in the fight against 
hunger. To have done so in China alone, UNRRA would have had to devote 
all of its resources to that country. In 1945 few Americans realized the 
challenge or the complexity of the operations of UNRRA in China. Certain-
ly UNRRA did not possess either the time or personnel to discharge its 
mission there. Thus the realization of a strong Chinese counterpart, an 
UNRRA subsidiary to . operate strictly in China, came into existence. The 
job which UNRRA had to .face in China proved to be technically more diffi:...: 
cult,~and the political significance of the organizational and adminis-
trative machinery used by UNRRA differed greatly from that used in Europe. 
Upon returning .to his native country on November 1, 1944, Dr. To 
F. Tsiang reported on his wo.rk with UNRRA to the Nationalist Government 
and received instructions to draft a statute providing ,fox the adminis-
tration of postwar relief and rehabilitation in China. Phe Executive 
Yuan acted favorably on the draft, as submitted by Dr. '11siang early in 
January, 1945, and forwarded it .to the Legislative Yuan for enactment. 
The Organization Statute of the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration, as promulgated on January 21, 1945, brought to completion 
.28 
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Dr. Tsiang' s lawmaking duties. Dr. Tsiang' s association with the organi-
zation, however, had just begun. He received the appointment as its first 
Director General. Cheng Tao-ju, then Secretary General of the Kweichow 
Provincial Government, moved to .the position of Deputy Director General 
of the admini·stration. The Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration, UNRRA colleague in China, and commonly referred to by its 
initials CNRRA, was given Ministry status. Its function centered on the 
administration of postwar relief and rehabilitation in China; also its ar-
ranged fulfillment of all agreed obligations of the Chinese Government 
toward UNRRA. 
The activities of UNRRA became so complex and varied within'._China 
that certain aspects of the work passed from CNRRA responsibility to 
other agencies. CNRRA, however, retained direct responsibility for all 
relief operations. The creation of fifteen regional and several supply 
and special field offices enabled CNRRA to expedite its activites. A 
Bureau of Relief was established to ensure that standards we--re met and 
to f'LU'Ilish general guid!hce and supervision over the regional and other 
field offices.1 To aid CNRRA in carrying out its program the UNRRA China 
' 
Office was opened in Chungking, China.'s wartime capital, late in January, 
1945. Benjamin H. Kizer, the former Chairman of War Labor West Coast 
Lumber Commission, serving as special representative of Mr. Lehman, be-
came the Director of the China operation. 
1United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Opera-
tional Analysis Papers, No. 2.2,, UNRRA in China 1945-1947 (Washington, 
D.C.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 128. 
The act"Qal administra~ion of relief and rehabilitation activities 
fell to C~ while UNRRA stood by for advice and supplied the greater 
number of experts who engaged actively in the relief activities. The 
· Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration served in a 
double role in its relief mission. It was the official agency of the 
Chinese Government for U:NRRA in China, as provided for in the basic agree-
ment; in addition, it was ~n executive organ of the Chinese Government 
created to handle relief and rehabilitation matters. 
The li.fe';;span of CNRRA was short. From its inc·eption until its 
liquidation only two years elapsed. During the period from October, 1945, 
through September, 1946, CNRRA occupied itself W'ith relief activities. 
Then from the first of October, 1946., until its liquidation, it concen-
trated on rehabilitation. The general operation of.CNRRA fell into three 
types of direct relief. Immediately after the liberation of an occupied 
area, CNRR,.A. provided emergency relief was administered for the natives. 
It gave food, clothing, and shelter to people in need. Preventive 
meast1;res against epidemics also occupied an important position in the 
emergency relief administered. 
The second phase of the direct relief activities consisted of aid 
given to displaced persons and refugees who had fled from the occupied 
a,reas to return to·their homes. Provisions were made for homeless 
children, the ei-ippled, and the aged without means.fo;r self support. 
CNRRA's work.centered, however, on public works, the rebuilding 
of :d:¢i.lways, highways, and dikes for the rivers of China. These ena,bled 
China to reconstruct her prewar transportation system and to rehabilitate 
the cultivated areas which were flooded during the war. 
Sales. of ce·rtain categories of supplies and from appropriations 
of the Chinese Government provided funds for the operations of CNRRA. 
The selling of· UNRRA supplies was not unique to China; all European 
countries receiving aid followed this pattern. The quantity of supplies 
sold in China, however, proved to be greater than the.quantity of supplies 
sold in Europe. Fqr the most part the government sold supplies directly 
to the consumer rather than through t,he free market. This method of 
financing the CNRRA program not only provided a profit but also met 
public relief needs. Finances for the entire CNRRA relief program rested 
most·heavily on the proceeds from the sales.of supplies and very little 
on the appropriations of the Chinese Governmeht,. 
CNRRA distributed some 900,0002 tons of foodstuff and some 28,0003 
tons of clothing,to,the inhabitants of the recovered areas. It is esti-
mated that about s:i.x:tymillion4 needy Chinese people in these areas re-
c:eived relief from CNRRA. The total cost of the material, and technical 
support given for a wide range of urgently needed.relief and rehabilita-
tion projects in China far exceeded that of any other country. The 
2Ibid., P• 246. 
3Ibid., P• 257. 
4 246. Ibid., P• 
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shipping and warehouse charges and certain other expenditures5 raised the 
total spending to about .$670 million. This a;m.ount included about .:, 
$517,800,000 worth of various supplies, weighing almost 2,500,000, long 
.tons.6 
,Perhaps one of the most note-worthy accomplishments in the field 
of rehabilitation was the closure of the Yellow River gap, known as the 
Yellow River Project, which divS'rted the river to .its former course. The 
project, a joint endeavor of CNRRA and the Ministry of Water Conservancy, 
was started in early 1946 and compJ..eted, or nearly so, in :March, 1947. 
The principa:l objective of the Yellow :River Project was the reha-
bilitation of China's •(food basket)'! some two milJ,.ion acres of· China's 
. most ,fertile farmland in the provinc.es. of Hona,n a:r:i.d .Annwei, a good part 
of which had been buried under a layer of sand and volcanic ash de-
posited by; the Xellow Riyer. The.re·clamation of t:nese areas would -;_· ... 
fa:vorab~ affect appre>Ximately,2001 000,000·persons. It was believed that 
. if the river's .course ·could be changed by,mid-~46,. that all, or nearly 
all, of the ·reclaimed land would be su;t'fici-ently ,drained by, fall to permit 
planting a winter wheat . .crop for harvest __ in,.June, 1947 • According to 
official Chinese· estimates, the -old river bed had a pot.ential prod1.1ctive 
5These e;xpenditµ,res involved cost- of coastal and internal shipping, 
displaced persona, 9perat.ions, and a foreign-exchange endowment fo'r UNRRA-
sponsored long-term projects; George Woodbridge, UNRRA_The Histo,ry of·~ 
- United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (New York: Columbia 
University Press,·1950, three.volumes), II,, P• 371. -
6woodbridge, UNRRA, II, P• 371. 
capacity of 7,500,000 bushels.of wheat. Further, a rice crop planted in 
the spring of 1947 and harvested in August of the same year could be ex..;. 
pected to yield about 13,800,000 bushels.7 
Twentieth century China has never been able to provide enough food 
from her own domestic agriculture to feed the masses of her people. She 
hhs always been dependent upon food imports. UNRRA off.icials agreed that 
this project would be the 'most .important contribution .that UNRRA could 
make to the agricultural rehabilitation of China. They stressed the point 
that" when·. :compl:eted,:. this project:. wouldLn:ot only permit· the growth of an · 
estimated 200,000, 0008 bush.els of grain annually, from the land reclaimed, 
then either flooded or cut off by-the river, but would alleviate pressure 
on UNRRA for foodstuff supplies and provide an important step forward in 
China's postwar recovery, 
Mr. Oo J._ Todd, a civil engineer who had spent twenty-one years in 
active engineering practice in China, speciaUzing chiefly in flood con-
trol and irrigation, received the appointment as chief UNRRA advisor to 
-the project. Of the eight major flood control projects, the Yellow River 
received top priority by both UNRRA and CNRR,A .• 9 
?united Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Monthiy 
UNRRA Review, XX (May, 1946), P11 22. 
8 ' Ibid., XVIII (February., 1946), P• 23. 
9The eight major flood relief projects included the ~elil.ow, Huai, 
Yangtze and Han, Chien Tang and Pe~l Rivers, the Grand Canal, and the 
Kiangsu.a.nd Chekiang sea walls. The:re were also sixteen minor flood 
relief 'projects and a large number of local conservancy projects; Wood-
bridge, 'ONRRAt Il, P• 428. 
The total Yellow River Project was carried out in four parts. The 
first undertaking in diverting the river to its original course was the 
closure of the Huayuank'ou break which had been widened to nearly a mile. 
After sealing the break, additional work had to be done in reinforcing 
the four hundred miles of dikes to .the sea. But before the gap could be 
closed, those peasants who had settled in the old river bed, and had 
taken up farming, had to be relocated. Once it had completed the closure, 
UNRRA had to carry out reclamation measures in the wartime areas. UNRRA 
experts in the fields of pl.anting, fertilization, drainage, livestock 
care and dairy operation were ready to begin work in the flooded region as 
soon as the river waters receded. 10 And CNRRA arranged the transfer of 
occupants of the old river bed to.their original land plotss 
Mr~ Tedd arrived in China during December, 1945, to lay the ground 
work for the giant project. The following month he served as the chief 
representative of UNRRA, with two additional engineers, one representing 
11 
the Ministry of Water Conservancy and the other the Yellow River Com-
mission, in making an official inspection of.the dikes from the break at 
Huayuank:-'ou to the Grand Canal. The plan decided upon, by the group of 
engineers, for repairing the break called first.for an earthen dike to 
cover 3400 feet of the tota.l width of 5000 feet, _a;ndl.in.,,the· seEond stage, 
10united Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 
Monthly UNRRA Review, XXI (May, 1946), P• 22~ 
11The :Ministry of Water Conservancy's name was changed from the 
National Conservancy Commission in 1946,. 
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the construction of a rock-fill dam for the water-covered section of the 
12 gap. 
To prepare for building the dike, CNRRA arranged for the deliveries 
of UNRRA equipment ~rid supplies from the ports of entry to the project. 
The supplies included food for the workers, primarily flour. In addition, 
CNRRA handled the relief and resettlement work in the areas reclaimed. 
On March 11, 1946, the UNRRA Shanghai Office reported that work on 
the giant Yellow River Project, the greatest of UNRRA's world-wide under-
takings proceeded night and day as a nucleus of UNRRA technicians, many 
of them recruited from the U.S. Navy "Seabees," and 150,000 Chinese labor-
ers started their dramatic battle against time. As reported, the break 
had to be sealed by late June, the high flood period or the months of 
work. and the vast expenditures would be swept away.13 
Limestone for the project came principally from the quarry at 
Lu wang fung, some sixteen miles from the dike break, the scene of the 
main project. Here a thousand laborers worked round the clock, using 
floodlights, and blasting out the limestone which would be used as a 
foundation ·for the new dike section. Chinese coolies carried much of 
the stone for the project on thtir backs. Workers transported some, how-
ever, by river boats, a spur railroad, and wheelbarrows or crude carts, 
over a dirt road which had to be wetted down to prevent . the dry, shifting 
120. J. Todd, "Yellow River Reharnessed," Geographical Review, 
XXXIX (January, 1949), P• 45. 
13 
UNRRA, Monthl.y UNRRA Review, XXI (May, 1946), P• 22. 
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soil with its extremely high volcanic ash content from becoming hopeless-
ly rutted.14 
At the site of the mammoth Yellow River Project itself, a vast 
army of workers placed tough kaoliang and willow sticks in position, for 
the earthen part of ·the dam, weighting them down with tons of limestone, 
pouring .in a broad clay core, and -then covering the whole with a thick 
layer of earth. This created a wall about 200 feet wide at the base and 
about sixty-five fe·et wide at the top. The forward part of the earthen 
dam almost collapsed at one time because of a freakish veering of the 
current. Only the massed efforts of thousands of wqrkers halted a near 
catastrophe.15 
At the main break, the water-covered section which remained after 
completion of the earthen dam, the worke'!'s built a heavy timber trestle, 
consisting of sixty-five feet Douglas fir piles, across the 1535 foot 
gap. Pile drivers brought by UNRRA from Portland, Oregon, forced the 
timber into the bed of the swift moving river. About five hundred of 
these piles, set . in rows from four to twelve feet apart, formed the base 
16 
of the trestle. Around the limestone foundation they placed a heavy 
wire flood matting similar to that used on the Mississippi River for 
flood controi.17 Seepage continued for a while but silt carried by the 
Mibid., P• 22. 
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~U:hiteci. }jatiorts Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Monthly 
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water fin.ally .Plugged all leaks. 
Under any circumstances mend:ing the breik in the ·dikes would repre-
sent a monumental victo;ry. over nat'I.U'al obstacles. The 1946 Yellow River 
' 
·repair project Jame to completion under the Jdded handicap of political 
division -.created by-·civil war. The Ch:inese Communists controlled most 
o.f · the territo,;ry tlu'ough which the old channel of ~he Yell.ow .River ran 
·and :in whic4 the 400 )Ililes of dikes had to be repaired.. Throughout much 
i 
of 1946 and early 1947, .Conimunistand UNRRA representatiyes met, inter-
mittently :in an attempt to complete the crucial dike reconstruction with 
aslittle :inter;ruption as possible. Cooperation proved possible during 
·the earlier period of negotiations; however, with the advance of ·the 
civil war b19tween the ~ationalists and the Communists, distrust mounted 
and the two factions disregarded previous commitments. 
) 
Early in the negotiations the Nationalists and Communists agreed 
that UNRRA flo:ur would be shipped :into the Connnunist-held areas for the 
. maintenance . of the Chines.e Communists engaged in the levee wo;rk-. UNRRA 
flour actually delivered to the Communists laborers amounted to some 
18 20,000 tons. The Nationalist Government further agreed that it would 
provide cash for pay:ing workers for the earth work in reconstructing the 
da.m.aged dikes :in the Communist-controlled area, but the work by the Com-
munist labq,rers had to be attest.ed by UNRRA engineers. Further, CNRRA 
shipped UNRRA relief supplies and provided allocations for·distribution 
am.ong the refugees who were .forced ~o!,J:l+OVe from the river bed. 
18 
· UN.RR.As- O;D$at.ional Analysis Papers, fu?. .. ~,. p.· 260. 
At.tempting ,·to for!'stall a compJ.ete breakdown of the Yellow River 
Project, UNRijA, CNRRA, N:ationalist Chinese officials, and members of the 
Communist relief :representatives stationed in Shanghai and 1'Janking ne-
. ) 
·gotiated arou;nd,'the -clock, but eventllally·cooperation ceased. Still 
some 200,000 ,Communist ami Nationalist, J.&l.borers participated in the dike 
program of 'the Yellow .River. Yellow River Commission engineers esti-
mated initially that the closure project--would require 2750 cubic meters 
of earthwo;rk. The p:rp~ect actually,required far more, however, and some 
twent,y-two million cub.ic meters of ·earth wo,rk eventually_ went into the 
.· closure project. for -rendering the dikes safe from Huayuank' ou ·_ to the 
sea.19 
The .equipment.and sµpplies furnished byUNRRA for the.closure 
project alon.e amounted to. 91 000._.long ·tons. In addition to this amount 
the internai;,ion,al organization provided some 5,000-tons of flour for the 
ijat,.ionalist ·Chinese wqrkers. The equipment .and supplies included 1,000 
long;wooden piles ot·orego,n pine, 800,000 board feet oi Oregon lumber 
which was used for ;t,rest:Lesand camp ho\l;ses for the supervisqcy ·person-
n~l. _ Also, the project consumed 2.,243,000 .sand bags, 2,300_.rolls of wire 
! 
mesh amounting-to JOO. tons.,. forty-three tons of wire- cable,. iron wire, 
. railway trac;:king, pile .drivers, bulldozers, trucks, barges, and numerous 
other·equipment.20 
TosuppJi;ement UNERA's foreign-made equipment.and supplies., the 
19T\..;;d 
. ~·, P• 260 • 
20Ib"d 
-L•, P• 259; Todd, ''Yellow River·Reharnessed," P• 49. 
Chinese ~ationalist Government _provided native materials, less expensive 
in natµre. Out-of nearby limestone .quarries came some 150,000cubic 
. meters of ·rock. ln addition, the J'.i)"a.tionalists made available an estima_ted 
50,000. tons. of .willow branches,.· 20,000 tons of kaoliang, .a _ta,11 Chine·se 
millet whose grain is used as a . cereal foorl, . 1,000 ,tons of 'hemp which was 
tw;i.sted into- rope by the workers and,. used to bind the. kaoliang and willow 
branches .for ·the ·:Ji'lood matting _and 198,412 units of short piling _and 
stakes. In addition to these supplies, 191 iron anchors weighted down 
21 
·the flood matting. Most importantly Chinese peasants put- roughly three 
million man-days of labor into th-e closwe prqject.22 
21UNRRA,- Operational Anal.ysis .Papers, No. u, P• ?59; Quoited ·from 
"Ilistory o_t the Yellow ~iver Project," unpublished dqcument~ed monograph. 
(155 PP• and Annexes), prepared by o. J, Todd. 
22Ibide,- P• 259. 
CHAPTER·IV 
IN•DEFENSE OF UNRRA IN CHINA 
Throughout its e.xi.stence UNRRA was plagued constantly with the 
shortcomings of ·its personnel anp. defects in its administrative structuree 
This makes its achievements all the more remarkable, and the lessons 
learned doubtless have application to future international.welfare pro-
jects'"""-'for, :Ch!inil: ,.anct, ... for th~' PMir of th~ W9f-±9: a§ W,(:}l~l}' · 
If we are to judge the activities of any international organiza-· 
tion--and judge thelll, we must if ·they are to have public support; then 
we must explain clearly the tasks which they face. We must realize what 
specific limitations are placed upon them by their policy-making bo,dies. 
The mass of the American population has known little about the history 
of international organizations, and Americans have known less about UNRRA 
than about most oth.ers. Some who ought to have· known better, regarded 
UNRRA as purely an American··ent.erprise. This general la.ck of information 
. conce:rming · UNRRA is reflected in various misconceptions which arose 
during ·the period .of ·its operation .an,d can be found in the types of , 
questions asked about UNRRA in letters to the ec;l.itors, editorial comments, 
and by strange id,eas thrown-out.by the daily columnistse .Woodbridge 
charges in his official histo;ry of UNRRA that many of the American corre-
spondents in China .failed to realize that the .first objective of· UNRRA 
was immediate relief and rehabilitation. The material which they dis-
patched, he charged was determined by their own interests and what they 
considered to be important. Thus they ~ailed to grasp the scope of 
1 
'UNRRA's activities. 
UNRRA critics often failed to comprehend that UNRRA officials had 
to draw a line between the two jobs of getting relief supplies into China 
and then distributing them equitably after they had arrived. The distri-
bution problem was the more serious one, and it subjected UNRRA to much 
criticism. To assure contributing countries--especially the United 
States--that supplies which they donated were reaching persons for whom 
they were intended, the organization applied .constant pressure and in-
spected frequently. 
A great deal of misunderstanding and controversy .evolved from reso-
lution number seven of the First Session of the UNRRA Council, which dealt 
with relief and rehabilitation policies. The resolution prohibited dis-
crimination in the distribution of UNRRA supplies based on race, creed, 
or political belief. Further, the general responsibility for distribution 
of relief supplies rested with the recognized government within any given 
area. All classes of inhabitants of an area, irrespective of purchasing 
power, received assurance of their equitable share of ·essential commodi-
ties. The resolution further provided that commodities sold by relief 
agencies should be pri.ced so as to facilitate the flow of such 
1George Wdodbridge, UNRRA The History of the United Nations Reli ef 
and Rehabilitation Administration (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1950, three volumes), I, p. 290. 
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commodities into proper hands and,tokeep rationing, price controls, and 
suppresflion of black.~rket activities at a minimum. Profit,margins on 
all purchases by·the recog:n,ized government of an area should be limited 
to a "fair and reasonable" amount. Normal agencies were to be .utilized 
to ,the maximum in t,he ciistribution ·of. supplies. The Director General, as 
·· the responsible official of· UNRRA, the resolution stated, must receive 
full,information concerning:distribution of supplies from the officials 
within all recipient areas. Finally, cooperation within each agency and 
with other rela_ted agencies was demanded for maximu,m efficiency of the 
-· overall program. 2 
• • • I 
. A constant problem· facing UNRRA officials involved the policy of 
selecting :recipients, thus making relief supplies freely available to all 
persons-who fell within certain clearly marked categories. Any discretion-
ary·· basis or any attempts at. ind;i.vid-u.al determination of needs violat.ed 
the charter governing UNRRA. Administrative devices employed for ·in-
-s'lµ'ing a reaflonable degree of compliance with the basic policy of UNRlU. 
. utilized not only local supervision ·of operating committees, but. field 
inspectors.or observers employed by'UNRM,. Many private.citizens and 
Congressmen of -the United· States toµred the r.eli.ef areas in China and re-
ported .. their findings. 
American newspapers. and newsmagazines frequently cha_;rged that 
. luxl:ll'Y' .:f,'o.ods and goods fo-u,nd their way 'to thos:e who. could pay the price. 
2united Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Journal 
First Session .Q! the Council (Atlantic City,. 10 November to l December, 
1943)(washington,. D,tc., 1947), P• 185. 
The poor masses, the u.s. often charged, went without the coarse essentials. 
In violation of resolution number seven, speculation, black marketeering, 
and hoarding were rampant, according to the editorial columns of numerous 
newspapers and letters to the editors of various magazines and the daily 
news press. Time newsma.gazine reported on July 22, 1946: 
Since November, 1945, UNRRA has pou,red $132,250,000 
wo~th of food.~.and various relief supplies ••• into the 
country Lchin§j. But only a trickle had got where they 
were needed most. The bulk of the supplies piled in ware-
houses filtered down into the depths of the black market, 
enriched the morass of government corruption and 'squeeze' 
(China's term for , -'Honest graft') •••• Flour supplied free 
by UNRRA was being sold far above the average Chinese's 
means. UNRRA Ford trucks were selling at $3,750 (gold).3 
Newsweek, of the same date, reported: 
'The starving continue to starve and needy remain 
without ••• Supplies are piling up in warehouses undelivered 
to the needy and hungry.' 
That was the net result of UNRRA's operations in China, 
according to a blast released last .week by JOO UNRRA em-
ployees4 ••• In a cable to Director General Fiorello H. La 
Guardia on July 9, they charged 'persistent misuse' of re-
lief supplies and suggested: 'It would be unfortunate, 
though justified, if because of ·continued failures of the 
Chinese Government, you were compelled to direct supplies 
to the needy .elsewhere in the world who would be assured 
of receiving these supplies.' 
La Guardia denied receiving the cable from his pro-
testing subqrdinates and denounced them for releasing 
their complaint .to the press.5 
Illegal activities dealing with the misuse of UNRRA supplies tended 
J "Thunder; UNRRA Relief Halted in China," Time, July 22, 1946, p. 
4The number reported by Time as cited above was "over 200 lo.cal 
UNRRA officials" which signed the cable. 
5"UNRRA: Iast Boat for China," Newsweek, July 22, 1946, p. 36. 
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to center in and around Shanghai .. Here, it is reported that godowns 
bulged while the needy areas called for supplies which never came .. "The 
Chinese people, starving almost within the dreamlike sight of rich rice 
and yellow wheatj hardly protested; they were too accustomed to inef-
6 ficiency and gra.ft .. n Reports of hoarding ahd speculation centered in 
Shanghai, prompted the Nationalist Government to replace the mayor who 
had served in this capacity during the early period of UNRRA shipments .. ? 
With revelat.ion of the scandal, incensed American ;readers and edi-
torial writers demanded the st9pping of·relief imports to China .. Top 
UNRRA lea.ders opposed the halting of shipments, howeverj on the grounds 
that this could only make a bad situation worse .. Scarcity is the mother 
of profiteering, they noted as they advocated an increase. in relief sup-
plies, thus making racketeering less lucrative.: During the first few 
months of llNRR.Ah, operation in China, the small volume of foodstuff im~ 
ported did not constitute a threat to the existing market price. Only 
once during the period of operation in China did the Director General 
find it necessary to suspend shipments, and this lasted for only a brief 
period. 
The Nationalist Government.desired, during the early period of 
CNRRA's operation to :maintain but not break, the existing food price 
J,evels@ It operated on the theory that the relatively high prices 
6
"ThUic'1de:rj D'NRRA Relief Hal~ed in China," Time, July 22, 1946, p. 27. 
?Donald S0 Howard, "Emergency Relief Needs and Measures in China," 
Social S8r,vice .J;j'~ew, XX (September, 1946), pp., 300-301. 
prevailing .. in late 1945 would directly benefit food .producers, wno not 
., only· constituted some ·eighty pe;r:" ·cent of ·china's total populace, but·had 
customarily.· existed on an , exl:rremely low economic level. 8 This . economic 
conclusion-··explains why-·the early food sa.les by CNRRA. averaged only five 
' . ' 
to ten· per cent below market price.s. If the · supplies had sold at . exa,-: ·· 
tremelylow prices, a greater and more rapid wreeking_of the existing 
price struct~e·would have been experienced. 
Critics of Umrn,A and_CNRB.A activities quarreled w:i-th the policy of 
selling any foodstuffs so long_~s the need for them among the lower eco-
··nomic classes.remained so_acut.e. TheY·,favo;red outright gifts of goods. 
However, the policy,of selling·foadstuffs.tended.to ,decrease with in-
creased appropriations of·contributing_~ou.nt;ries a.nd finally-stopped alto-
gather. Those who favored the sale of supplies arg11ed that China .c·~uld 
best rehabilitate small industries and trad.e by putting important relief · 
commodities into· nqrmal trad,e channels, which in turn would decrease the 
. possibility, of_ racketeering. 
Coal wo.rkers, · construction workers, and other peasants actively 
engaged inthe·reconstruction-program often-received UNREA imported flo:ur 
in lieu of wages. This flow sometimes turned up on the local _market, 
thus providing fuel for-c:biticism,of'UNRRA by its critics. The .quality 
of flo1Jl', ,which constitu,ted a large proportion of 'UNRRA's imports, .con-
sisted of a g;rade far Sllperior toany,u:sed br·the poorer classes of 
Chinese. B,ecause of ·its· superior quality_,and the fact that flou,r was 
8Ibid., P• 3,01. 
one of the most .significant. impqrt food items, its distribution served as 
a.source of ·great criticism and.illicit activity. Otten Chinese officials 
in charge of administering supplies considered it· ''too good" for the "low 
ones." Not infrequently the administrators-substituted an inferior grade 
of Chinese floµ,r for the sup1:;rior UNRRA import and distributed the in-
ferior product to the peasants. 
Ilona Ralf Sues,. author of Shark Fins and Millet, and a severe 
critic of CNRR.A and the Nationalist Government, stated that: "Fiorello H. 
La Guardia would go down in, Chinese history as the only present day Ameri-
can official who placed human rights above political and military oppor-
tunism.rt Miss Sues had previously served ten years in the opium cont.rel 
wprk at .Geneva, for the League of Nations, .and during UNRRA's operations 
she lived in China and stµdied the economic and political conditions in 
that country. She described La Guardia as one of the few who believed 
and tried to practice what he preached and who possessed themqral fiber 
to.stand up for the Chinese peasants in the face of all opposition. La 
Guardia, she believed, adhered to the ideas of ·the spokesmen for the vast 
majority of·the Chinese people, who pleaded for the discontinuance of 
military, financial, and economic support, to the government. of Chiang Kai-
shek. She points oµt that·our unconditional assistance to Chiang Kai-
. shek practically. nullified the results ach;Leved by General Marshall. in 
establishing peace negotiat.ions between the Kuomintang and the Communists. 
The Director Qeneral stopped shipments on one occasion beca.11;se·he felt 
that the Chinese Government .was using relief supp,lies as an anti-democratic 
political weapon. Miss Sues charged that the UNRRA scandal in China .derived 
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I from our obtuse help to the reactionary clique surrounding the General-
issimo0 CNRBA9 she reported, was nothing more than a government monopoly· 
which made the decisions governing the distribution of su,pplies .. The 
Chinese relief program fell completely under the-control of·the "Soong 
Dynasty" which at this ·time controlled finances,' foreign· relations, and 
almost all profitable ,rackets in China!> She. charged that flour and other 
relief·items were in many cases dist:ributed by the phony "labor·unions" 
of the Kuomintangs People employed at the time relief distribution 
started got relief, and those unemployed were not allowed to join the 
labor uniohs, thus allowed to·starve because they had no means of support .. 
During the first two months of 1946, Miss Sues.further charged, that some 
thirty to ~ixty Chinese. children were picked up weekly from the streets 
1.0 bf Shangh~i having died from starvation .. 
Miss Sues also advances the opinion that CNRRA's program of in-
dustrial rehabilitation served as another racket.controlled by the 
Kuomintang Party., Here, she charges that a person in good standing 
could buy all the machinery he wanted, but the less fortunate, who had 
lost everything during the war and occupation, found himself unable to 
purchase any. of'the ne~ded industrial supplies .. This resulted in a 
. . . 11 further concentration of wealth in the hands of the selected few .. 
The following -excerpts are typical of the criti<:ism offered by 
. UNR.RiA workers who spoke out against CNRRA and the existing conch tions in 
p .. 71 .. 
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China d~gthe periodof.UN.RRA1 s operations. The excerpts are·frqm a 
letter Wl"itten by;.an .American UNRRA. worker stationed in Tsingtao., Shantung 
;province, China, Dr. Catharine L. D.ealta.d, to a friend- of The Nation: 
'.['he Nationalists_have been -clev~r enough to get Kiser, 
the UNRRA director, LShanghai· branch/ to give them carte 
blanche-in the allocation ,of UNRRA supplies .... It.:is tragedy 
·· in view of .the· need and th,e indescribable po.verty and. misery 
that the money spent by UNRBA isn't.in the ha.nds of men who 
- are 100 per cent honest •••• There are too many · .Americans and 
- Englishmen in this organization for what .they .-·can get O'\lt, of 
· it--people who don't give a damn about_.the Chinese and who 
are· willing to. play· ball with the Nationalists in CNERA..12 
Dr. H;erbert K. Abrams., Regional Medical Officer for UNRRA in 
.Shantung Province from November, 1945, to July, 1946, .reported that 
techn.ieal difficµli;ies were imp9sed 'by CNRif.A officials ,which made it a-1-
most .imposeible- to get. the desperat,ely needed med.ical .supplies into the 
Communist-controlled areas of Shantung. The-CNM,A regionaLmedica.l oJ .... 
ficer a ttempt.ed to carry I out the UNR;RA-CNR(?.A program but was black-listed 
• ;lJ 
and the:p.-d:i,.scharged. 
IndiVid-u.als in t'.q.e United-States opposed UNRBA for varied reasons, 
and .it would be most difficult ;j:,o group the criticis into cat.egories or 
to. establish a t:rue · pattern of criticism. However, _it can be conclllded 
that much of·the critical publicity.of UNRRA coming from the u.s. press 
. evolv,ed from ignorance i!nd was colqred by,, sentimentality or political 
bias.. Membe:rs of ·congress followed no. strict_ partisan line _in their 
l2oatha.X."ine.D. Lealtad, M._n., "Letter to t,he·Editor - Report"from 
China," !h!;'Nation,. ,CLXII (June 29,, 1946), P• 794. 
1
.?Herbert K~ Abrams, )iI.D • ., "Health Rehabilitation in' Shantung," 
Far Eastern Survs¥, XV (Novemb,er 6, 1946)., p .. 341. 
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voting habits on UNRRA legislation; however, liberal I)emocrats were more 
vocal in supporting UNR.ItA legislation than the more traditional conserva-
ti:ves of both the Democratic and Republican parties. The more.rabid con-
servatives held to their traditional isolationist attitudes and opposed 
all issues concerning UNRRA ari.sing .in Congress. 
Daniel A. Reed of New York, a member of 'the Republican opposition, 
was· perhaps the most outspoken· critic of 'UNRRA in Congres.s. On March 11, 
1946, speaking before the House of B,epresentatives, he stated that it was 
his desire to "call attention, as I have done several times previously, 
to the extravagance of the organization kno:wn ·as UNRRA. 1114 Mr. Reed con-
t.inued to relate that black markets had developed out of UNRRA abroad, 
and that several hundred people·employed by UNRRA engaged themselves with 
.black market activities and "have never been give;n the pu,blicity whiah this 
cheap political organization deserved.rrl5 Congressman Reed felt that the 
cha:rity .of ·c the United. States should be carried on exclusively by American 
-church organizations. 
In direct contrast to the viewpoint.expressed on many occasions by 
Congressman B,eed and his cohorts· can be fo.und the statement made earlier 
by General.:Eisenhower, before the House Foreign ,Affairs Committee on 
November·22, 1945: 
It is a privilege for a soldier to have the opportunity 
of pleading for assistance in repairing the ravages of war. 
14a.si> Congressional Record, 79th Cong •. , 2d Sess., · 1946, XCII, 
Part 10, .A.1265. · 
l5Ibid. 
The Congress has appr9priated many-billions .of·dollars 
during the pa.st few years to:enable us to forge th,e 
weapons of ·des~ructionu •• :i: have noted suggestions th,a.t 
·t,he·United·stab~s shoulddischarge !.his _!:esponsibility 
Lfo"l:eign_reliei:/ single-handed • .-.-LUNRR!/ was established 
to do this speo,:tfic job andi.t would be-wasteful to 'dis-
.sipa.te -its -experience ••• ,16 
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. A statement -on behalf of ·UNRRA_, by_ the· District. of · Columbia Branch 
of the National Assoc;i.!tion for the Advancement,of Colored People, was 
read into the· Congressi_onal H.ecord by ·the Honorable Jerry Voorhis. of 
Ca+ifornia., on November 24, 1945: 
.In the interest of ·human kindness we cannot allow 
the .people of China ••• and other liberat·ed countries to 
face starvation and .complete annihilation while we ,enjoy 
_ prosperity •.••• It is our responsibility ••• to see· that 
'those less fort-una.t.e- than we are supplied nth at least 
the barest fundamentals for ·existence.17 
Co?l8l"esswo,man Emily Taft Douglas of· Illinois, .a member of ·the 
Democratic sttpporters oftJNRRA,_read into the Conp;ressiona.l Record on 
October 24, .1945., an· edito.rial'. from the New York Times of· the previous 
~ ·-------. . 
__ day. The editqrial was an-urgent_plea for an·increas_e of funds for the 
extension ,_and c.ontin:u.a~~e of 'UNRRA activitie.s. Twice· d'I.U'ing ·the month 
,of·october,. 1945, President Truman-urged Congress for action and reminded 
them of the necessity of living up to our committed obligations with 
UNRB.Ai. , At .this time UNR.RA's massive relief program for the newly libera-
. ' . .... 
ted ·China .rested with Congressional appropria~ions. The editorial 
1
~Th_e·Ne:w York Times., Nov-ember 23, 1945, P• 8. 
17 · 
. u_.s,. Gongressi0nal Record., 79th Cong • ., 1st Sess • ., 1945., XCI, 
Part_ 13., A5240~ - - -- - -
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smnma.rizes. its object. in the statement: ·. "UNRRA is not, an instr1:llil.ent .of 
·polfcy--ikis; :like: the: .. Red. C:ro:ss,: ~ disaster ·se:rnni:ce ... _. ,In: the: name: ~f " 
'humanity, Congress .should act without. further dela,y.tr18 
' . 
The;Michigan Coiincil of ·ch'Ql'ches and Christian Educationfqrwarded 
a .letter to the Honorable Georges. Sadowski on October 12, 1945, urging 
support of mm.RA• The Mich,igan Council feltc. that as a Christian .;nation 
the United States. should render all he;I.p possib:L.e · to this international 
relief organization; it also ~urged the Co~essman to support a.11 measures 
for -rehabilitat.:i,on of liberated wa.r ... t.o:rn. countries and the immediate re-
lease of~ funds. 'l'he Council felt that ,the fut-u;re peace of the 
world would ·be-in jeopardy.as long .as people were al.;Lowed to go.hungry.19 
CJ.a.re Boothe Luce, a strong Republican supporter of UNRRA., read 
.into-the Congressiop.a.l Record-onDecember·21, 1945, a letter·which she 
had writt.en to· the .editor of the Greenwich Review. (Connecticut). The 
letter ·served to answer a specific letter which had appeared in the Review 
and other c:ritical_,.correspondence in general which .had appeared p;r,eviously 
·· in the pa.per. Mrs. ;Lu.ce e;x:pla.ined · the reasons .for ·tl+e need. of inoreas.ed 
appropriation-for U~t .. She ·reasoned that UNRM could not .confine it-
self simply to. meeting ,the deficiencies creat,ed by wart.ime destruction 
and loss. of· ·manpower, but the. relief orgar:i.iza.tion had to ,go beyond ·this 
and provide additional services for the people of ·formerly occupied areas .• 
Mrs •. Luce pointed out in the letter that ... it .is often overlooked by many 
18Ibid.11, PP• AJ+478-A/+4'7/9. 
19Ibid .. , P• M.577. 
that- UNMA was :an intema.tional · organization and not exclusively an Aineri-
can-organizati-0n. Duej:,o the natureo~ the organization, its activities 
. fell under t:t+e cont,r.ol of all members of the'.United Nations. She con-
tinued in pointing. out .that the needs abroad WE!re, of the.- most urgent 
-nature and l;ieyond verbal :_description;. regardless of 0t}:l.e ab.uses of UNRRA 
and .-the inefficiency: found within the organization., which. were 'being ·cor .... 
. rected, America and .Americans• had· to support UNRRA.20 .In reply to pre-
vio'L!,s remarks :made by Mrs. Luce :in the' House of 'Representatives., Herbert 
H •. Lehman w:rot.e her frq)Il. UNRRA Head.quarlers tha:nking her for the support 
of Ul\lRRA and informing her that·· $.50 women co:rmnemators would carry her 
defense of' "ON.RRA. on· their b,rao,dcasts, qi' 'December· 13, 194.5, along with a 
statemen:t-from La.fell Dickinson., J:ifational President .. of General Fede-ration 
·of Women's .Clubs.21 
.On Thanksgiving Day1 November 22; 1945, .the Di;rectqr General -of 
.. UNRRA, Rer'oert. H. Lehman., p~raded ·the cause. of 'UNRRA before the American 
people over th~ Columbia ~roadcasting System: 
Thanl<:sgiving Day is.adeep1Y'--cherished American tra-
dition ..... Today we American.a fervently give· thanks on this., 
the first, Tha.nk,sgiving DaY .. ,.aft.er we· have come through a 
great .peril-.uToday·this nation is .free an.d_mtited - ... its 
people are healthy- a:n:d have.food in abmndance; . Qod has.been 
good. to us •••• T0day;t.hepeople.of Europe and China are thank-
. fuL t4at many years,bf death fr.om the air - and slave labor 
·· - and,<:·oncep..trati.on camps. - are at an ,eµ.d. But, alsq., 
their danger is not abated,. Hunger and ~old, disease_ and 
suffering ·stalk the· streets and the .byways •••• ! ·must plead 
2
~I:bid-.;, P• A.5742. 
2lffeid. 
b,efore the, court qf J\.mer-ican··opinion the cause of ·these 
millions_ of suffering victims ·.of war who .must. otherwise 
stand mute and helpless .in the· face of disaster •••.• You, 
:rey- -fellow AmeTicans, .. and. o~. you - will decide -the fate 
· of thoeie people wh,o fought. alt:mgside yoµr sons, who bled 
and died :with .them -- and who today/are still dying.22 
Continuing, Mr. Lehman.-reminded the American people that .the 
United States took _the lead in estabJ.,i.shing :tJNRRA and in championing 
UNRRA.; the United States acted not only for huma.nita:rian reasons, but 
53· 
.also for enlightened self-interest. .He pointed out that no nation can 
.. remain healthy in a disease .... ridden world and no country could. remain 
strong anp. prosperous.in.a wo,rld wracked by sta~tion·and social chaos. 
·But continuing, Mr. Lehman said that UNRRA's criticism came from the 
. United States, the richest, healthiest, and the best-fed nation in, the 
world,. and· to him·· ·this came as a most.· disheartening sµrprise. He· stated 
that .in those ·-countries which .s¢'fered the ·most, as we have never called 
upon to.sµff'er, there can be .found nothing·but t,he-highest praise for 
UNREJlt's werk and a solid- support behind it. He- concluded- his appeal 
. with:. · "Let us then finish,t,h,e job at .hand. UNRRA can -prove in truth 
t~t-int.er.rtatio:nal-'-COoperation-is. not just a hope but.a reali.ty. And 
every.day that COUl'age,: strength and-health .is given to thesµffering 
millions.,..abroad ii..ii will constitute £or them a. day,.of Thanksgiving, 
. in which we, too, will be able to join with all ow hea.rts,1123 
Perha.p.ft one: of ·the:,;rn.ost. intense and humane pleas,·· made in behalf 
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of UNRRA- can J>e contributed to the Most :Reverend_' Richard J. Cushing, 
_ Archbishop of 'Boston, .at the Communion Breakfast of ·the St. Vincent De 
-Paul S0ciet7, on December 9, 1945: 
The scope of charity embraces everything :we do for 
o~·fellow being:s out of'the love of God without any-hope 
. af material::l'e~:rd .... The challeE.ge to charity,is -thus .a 
challenge of Christianity. If we·love God, then love of 
neigh;bo.:r is the necessa;i:-y cor.ollary. of -1ove of 'God .. •• We 
attached no-ride:r to oµr J.end-lease·shipment.s of war -
materials. Should we now attach\ one to charity? If we 
do, and if the UN.gRA should fail for lack of f'Qnds, then 
the Good Samaritan has been wayla,id .... The people. of•••• 
China.,. and several- other ·countries which- have no credit 
r-esoµrces will not eat ,without. UNRRA •• _.In all human 
history there was -ne:ver such --- sorrow, suffering __ and star-
va t.ion •• ". The ·w~k a:f · the United Nations Relief and Reha-
-bilitation Adm:in.istration must not fail .... we· have a 
moral duty to make· kn0WI1 our opinion• on the ·matter ••• Write 
. immediately ••• to yo-µr representatives in Congress •• .,.If 
we do not. measure up to -the task, _the basis for an en-
- during peace will not 'be laid in this generation.24 
51.;. 
Sho~ly after· be co.ming: ;Director General of UNRRAi Mr. La. Guardia, 
on May .10,, 1946, spoke before_, members . of the :National _Press Club, 
_ Washington, n._o., in· defense of UNR.BA and attempted to .clear ·up some of 
the -erroneous rumors and misconceptions concerned with the operational . 
f'lJ!lC.tions of the· organization. To the -charge· that tThTRRA food. could be 
brought._on- the open market, Mr. La Guardia ,:-eadily:. admitted the truth of 
thi-s accusation. He explained the- situation- and ·the- factors which .made 
this , neceesa.ry and then -sp_oke on UNRRA' s distribution , 1;>ystem. He pointed 
out that._.a regula:r budget.is kept :on. file for each of the :receiving 
24u,.s~ O:ppgressional Record, 79th Cong • ., 1st Sess., 1945, XCI, 
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. countries and each· one had an appropriation or allocation ma.de to it. He 
explained that this.al.iliocationresult,ed from intensive study on the .part 
of·the UNRRA organi!Zation, that.it ,was approved by the Director General 
. . 
and then· submitted to the Central Colill11.ittee, which consisted of repre .... 
sentatives o,f ·the ·various .countries which Jna.de up the UNR];l.A Council, and 
that ·this group served as the final approving agent for the allocations. 
Mr. La Guardia then explained that in administering those funds, the ad-
ministrative hody ·had to .adhe.re strictly to the appropriations. To the 
illogical charge that one coi:mt;ry'-receiyed more aid than another, the Di-
-.. rector General ·replied that the appropriations were ma_de on an· equitable 
basis. Many facto.rs had to be taken into consideration, such as the 
amount·, of devastation, the area of population, the nieans of transportation, 
the· economic condition.oLtb.e .. c~ountry, and the food situat,ion.25 
The Director General ·continued by stating ·that the Department of 
Agr,iculture in the United Stat;es served as the food purchasing or pro-
. cµring agent . for UNRB.A11 . The Director· General's office forwarded requi-
sitions .to the Department of Agriculture,. the Department ,did the purchasing 
and then at the -direction of tl+e administrat.ion shipped the foodstuff• Mr. 
La Guardia declared· that it .would require a study ,of at least a. sixty to 
ninety ·day .period of weekly reports of shipment.s and disparities to get 
·, 
. a true picture of ·the distribution process. Foodstuff and ·supplies upon 
· reaching the receiving ,country fe:J..l into the ·.channels of 'the· recognized 
25Transcript· of UNRRA Director General Ia Guardia's .A,;idress to 
Members of ·the Wational Press Club, Washington, D~c~,- 1:00 P.M. Friday, 
10 Mayl946. 
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government, of that,o.ountry, and the government .distribµ.ted. them thro1,J,gh 
' 
. the· regtila;r · channels of· trade or· .sold the colIJJllodi ties at :ceiling <Pri:ces. 
F;rom the,·proceeds of sales, the cost of distribui;,ion and the expenses of 
.the Missions· had' t.o be deducted. The Directo:r General .. reported that. these 
pro.ceeds .. could be· used for a~;t'iculturaL.reha.bilitation, machine.:ry ·fqr 
agriotilt.ural purposes, :reconstruction of· roads and highways, the 1'epair 
of public utilities, or ·for health and welfare purposes. But,the.appro,.. 
26 priat,e· lJNlWA Mission, checked the uses to . which these proceeds were put. 
·To the charge of m:JRRA f1our being sold by·individuals, Mr. La. 
Guardia. replied that this.was ;quite understandable. The many people 
s'µffering from aoject poverty,.wouJ.d often find it .n~cessa.ry to trade their 
·rations for ·something:else which they needed most.urgently, such as medi--
. cal. supplies. or other· such important items,. The ;flour was a.cc,umulated by 
·certain ind.ividu,al~ and. then ·sometimes it.would find .its way_:.:t,o·the 
shelves of the black marketeers. .Mr. La Guardia pointed oµt that .. the 
situation resulted from the dire needs andneces~it,ies of the people ·in-
volved, and thus it was out .,of' the hands of. lJNRM. to contl*ol directly. 
The ·same factors would be· true· concerning· ·clothing which UNRRA had shipped, 
to · China f0r distrihutio:i;i.. 27 
An<:>ther·sto,ry which Mr. La Gua;rdia ati;.empted to squelch involved 
the· rwnors· that luxury a;rticles including liq1:1or,, had 'been .shipped to 
China byUNR.R.!1" The Directo;r (}.eneral·replied that,if·it had happened, 
26 
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I 
it ,was befq:,re· his- asl'$cociation wJ.th, UNR~., .and would have happened 
under any adm.inistrai:,ion. He re~ted that just.preceding V-J.Day·there 
: 
were seye:ra:l steamers he.ad.ad for their destination in the Far East,, In 
·the week ·or .we·eks that folloirled UNRRA purchased fJ:tom the Army some fifteen 
I 
I 
,complete ca;r,go~s of' th,ese ~hips. ; The ste~~rs tr~sported general cargoes 
for ·united States military '!~erso~~l in the Fkr EJst, and they carried 
. !,. ' ··. ' 
about ninety p~r cent. food, t~d b6i~ ten p~r cent.iid.scelri.neou~, cargo. Qf 
·this ten-per cent.miscellaneous c~rgo ,could be·found soit drinks, toilet 
>ari;,icles, . canned beer, and other perscmal items demanded by our military· 
. personnel. in all theaters of operations. Further, M;i:-. La Guardia pointed 
\ 
' 
out that it --was ext:remely difficult to get the accurate ma.nif est listing 
of ·these cargo.es. 13ut UNRRA needed f.ood for China .and most prudently and 
wisely purchased the .complete ·cargoes. The food.stuff received normal 
distribution and the other items were placed in storage. After La Guardia 
became· Director General _instructions were issued that such toilet arti-
cles which .would be· o.f com.fort to any of the· United States Missions in 
China, ·any personnel .of 'the United Nations., qr hospitals or institutions 
in China should be distributed toithem .... · -"The -beer· ·we hav~f a.l= 
· ready sold back -to the Arrrfy' - they know how to use· it •1128 
In, ~valuat,ing··tJNRR/t in China, Woodbridge concludes !in his histqry 
of ·~29 that··certain UNRRA field- operations suffered undue and often 
resultant misrepr,esenta t$-on · in the press of .the v.ariou:3_ contributing 
28 
. Ib;id., 
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·,countries. He fee.ls that -this. often resulted from errors in judgment or 
failwes on the part of UNRaA public information personnel. He states 
that they .failed to. realize that information they considered to be every-
day knowledge was often unknown elsewhere. But more often, it resulted 
from snap judgments made by correspondents and visiting ·celebrities 6n 
the basis of inadequat.e and erroneous information and observation. Mr. 
Woodbridge ·. freely admits that some of the· bad press in the· United States 
and· the United Kingdoms on UNRRA operations in China was unquestionably 
d.eserved. However, he further states that. some of it undoubtedly arose 
from the unfq;rtunate but prevalent.· confusion of UNRRA' s activities and 
CNRRA's fields of operations. 
The Chinese·Nationalist Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
wcrked·closely with UNRRAw Its staff came partially from UNRRA personnel 
on loan, and CNRRA had'the responsibility of handling UNRRA supplies and 
giving a ssistanpe to UNRRA relief .service programs,. But, CNRRA was an 
official .. organ ·of'the Chine·se National Government, and because of this 
fact, theNat.ionalist Government.alone :was .responsible,fqrits policies 
and its personnel. This fact.seldom found mention·in the press and the 
western press, and its readers generally fail.ed to grasp it. Thus UNRRA 
alone bore· the .brunt of 'the criti.cism. 
CHAPTER.V 
THE AMERICAN ROLE IN UNR,RA·· .... OUR· SERVICES· TO ·cHJNA 
The' story .,of UNRRA does not end with the foregoing account of 
governm.~ntal policies and officials. Foreign voluntary agencies, both 
professional and religious, also cont;t'ibuted much to the UNRRA project 
in China. The voluntary groups contributed supplies and personnel di-
rectly to UNRRA; and, in adq.ition, they supplemented UNRRA's work through 
.theirindependentp:rograms. In handling displaced persons,. to cite one 
example, theyt,ook care•of a problem which limited :resol.ll'ces prevented 
the Chinese Government and UNRBA from resolving.,.l 
From the qeginning, UNRRA officials recognized the importance of 
'the active voluntary foreign ·relief agencies. Resolution riine entitled 
"A Resolution :ij.elating to-Welfare•Services and Voluntary Relief Agencies," 
and passed by the First Session·of the Council, stated that welfare 
services.administered by orin conjunction with UNRRA,. would bead.minis-
., 
tered without: discrimination oon<:forning race, creed, or political belief. 
This. meant that ,the agencies had to, operate,_ if they were to ope;rate 
legally in China, on a broad impersonal basis, .rather than on a narrow 
. la-eorge Woodbridge, UNRRA The History qf the United Nations Relief 
and Rehabilitatio.n Administration (New York: •Columbia University Press, 
1950., three volumes), II, P• 67. 
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personal basis t.o bolster the prestige of their own agency. Further, the 
resolution stated that it would be the policy of the organization, subject 
to the consent and regulation of the Director General, t.o seek and enlist 
.the cooperation and pa,rticipation of appropriate foreign relief agencies, 
. in so far as they could be effectively utilized in relief measures for 
2 
which they might have special competence and resources. 
The original UNRRA Agreement provided that the Director General 
would proceed, innnediately upon taking office, with the emergency relief 
plans for the civilian population in areas occupied by the Chinese mill-
tary, or by any of the United Nations. He should coordinate his plans and 
action with the military and other appropriate authorities. Further, the 
Director General was responsible for the arrangements leading to the pro-
curement and assembly of all necessary, supplies and for creating or se-
lecting ·the ,emergency organizations which would be needed to carry out 
these activities. In addition, the basic UNRRA Agreement stipulated that 
foreign voluntary · relief agencies could not engage in activities, iii 
areas receiving ·,relief from UNRRA, without the consent or unless they 
subj.ected themselves to the regulations of ·the Director General.3 The 
extent to whi-ch the foreign voluntary relief agencies wouJ.d be used in 
giving assistance, in the relief and rehabilitation o,f natives, would be 
a matter ·determined by the Director General in consultation with the 
2 
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Journal 
First Session-of the Council (Atlantic City, 10 November ·to 1 December 
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recognized governm.ent,of'the,areas where~ operated.4 
:A.s.a'.result;the·voluntary agencies which•cooperated with UNRltA 
made a significant cont;c_-ibution to the ultimate succe.ss of !:JNRRA in China. 
These,contributions were felt.both in the help given '!JNERA in·meeting tJ+e 
. needs of · UNRRA-a ssisted countries and in building· up int,erna tion,al under-
standing .•... Further, the offi.cials of UNRRA. and CNRRA reaUzed the. desiJ:,-
·ability. of :close working .·connections with· the volmtary relief societies 
as these groups would: .. bet,thB ;sour:ce of·~cont.inuing: relief ineasur,es: .aft.er, 
· UNRRA relief act.ivities had ended. 
To. asaure · t.he· best possible, coordination among· the voluntary 
. agenQ;i.es· at the nation,a1·1evel, a National Clearing ·Committee was .created 
in China, The committee included members from CNRRA1 UNRRA, the Ministry 
of ·social .. A.:e!airs., and to.reign ·and Chinese voluntary agencies.5 In many 
cases the .committee· failed to accomplish its objectives, but it did pro ... 
vide much valuable·information on inter-agency_ problems.and.made for 
better ··coeperat,ion among the, foreign iand national agencies. As a result 
or this extensive inte:r-agency,.cooperation, numberles:s Chinese who would 
not othe:J:"Wise have benefited were saved from utter destitution. 
To properly understand the extensive role played by_voluntary 
agencies in China, . we need to, observe· the UNRRA sit:µati.on there at the 
\. 
4 
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'United Nations.Relief and Rehab.ilitation Administration, Report 
.of . the .Director _General 12,: the: Council (For the Period l July 1947 to 
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close of the war. The UNRM China office, a.s of September 30, 1945, had 
only fifty-three pe;rsons,on regular appointment and twenty-one others.en 
6 
route to China. Likewise ONREA suffered from an inadequate staff. The 
sudden acceleration of·the overall China program at.this t:ime made it 
necessary to.,ip,crease the staff of both.organizations without .delay. The 
China organization had proposed to ,carry on its operation with local 
personnel; however, it requested UNRRA's aid in procuring.many of the 
highly ·trained professional wqrlcers who· were needed in the over-all 
program. The ·recruitment. for China proved distinctive in .that candidates 
were·sought who could work in·fields much.broader than their speciality, 
but still thef:had tobe highly specialized t.echnicians. The majority 
of positions .· called for · experts . in health, welfare, . and agricultural and 
industrial.rehabilitation. 
The schedule called for recruitment.for the China operations mainly 
in 1946. The acceleration of the China program, however, prompted CNRRA 
officials to request UNRRA to provide at.the earliest possible date a 
total of 1,048 persons for se~vice in China. Of this number about half 
were needed to work.directly with CNRRA and other cooperating .Chinese 
Mmistries11 · UNRRA. Headquarters had hoped for a broad representation of 
nationalities with not more than sixty per cent of the quota from the 
United States. !h-e Se.cretary of War authori~ed on August 29, 1945,. the 
release·o.f'U'nited St1;1,tes . .A1':my" personnel in the China and Pacific 
6united Nations Relief and Rehal;>iiitat,ion Administration, Report 
.9£. the Director Genera.l !£. the Council (Fo:r the periodi l July 1945 to· 
3.0 September 1945) (Washington, D~C~, 1945), P• 52. 
theaters eligible for discharge who desired to work with UNRRA~ Both 
the British and Canadian Armed Forces issued silllilar orders. 8 
Both professional and religious voluntary agencies served as im-
portant sources of UNRRA personnel in China. Some sixteen American 
agencies, professional and religious, loaned personnel to UNRRA and most 
of these same agencies were active in China during this period.9 In 
addition, ten British agencies and eight other various, non-Chinese, 
national agencies loaned personnel to UNRRA.10 . A total of some forty to 
fifty alien and non-alien, secular and religious agencies worked for or 
with UNRRA and CNRRA during the period of their relief activities within 
the country. 
Fo;r most positions within the UNRRA staff, a university or pro.-
fessional education and administrative or techni~al experience of at 
least five years served as a prerequisite for the program. Candidates 
8 
Ibid., P• 53. 
9u,.s, Agencies which loaned personnel to UNRRA were: American 
Christian Committee for Refugees; American Friends Service Committee; 
American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee; Congregational Christian 
Se~:v±ce Committee; Girl Scouts of America; Greek War Relief Association; 
Hadassah; International Migration Service; International Rescue and R~ 
lief Committee; Mennonite Central Committee; National Catholic Welfare ' 
Conference; Near East Foundation; Southern Baptist Convention; Unitarian 
Service Committee; World Student Relief; and Young Women's Christian 
Association; UNRRA, Report of lli Director General of the . Council (For 
the Period l July 1947 to 31 December 1947 and Summary of Operations 9 
November 1943 to 31 December 1947)(Washington, D.c., 1948), Appendix II, 
P• 359. 
10 UNR.aA;. Report of the Director General to the . Council (Fo-r the 
Period l July 1945 to 30 September 1945), P• 53. 
accepted for UNRRA employment had to pass a strict medical examination 
and acknowledge a willingness to endure physical hardship. Persons from 
thirty to forty years of age fell within the preferred age category, and 
individuals over fifty fo,und it most ,difficult to obtain a position with-
out exceptional qualifications, or a speciality falling :in the acute 
shortage category. lack of foreign language qualification ,did not pre-
vent employment, but knowledge of a foreign language aided in these-
lection of personnel for employment. All applicants who possessed 
suitable qualifications undenrent ,an interview by UNRRA officials and 
investigation prior to appointment. 
UNRRA Headquarters attempted to equate salaries w:;Lth those of com-
parable civilian occupations by basing salary standards for various 
positions requiring training and experience in the country where the em-
ployee resided permanently. Previous experience and earnings also 
fi~ured in the determination of individual salaries. In addition, a 
fielcLallowance . de.signed to cover the extra cost of living _abroad in-
creased income beyond base ·salary, and allowances paid to married persons 
or employee.s . with dependents were greater than those pad.d ,to single 
persons. OccaE\ionally the amount paid employees with the same qualifi-
cations differed even within -certain countries, depending on a great 
difference in the ·cost of living in specific areas. 
The Chinese Government's initial "Program and Estimated Require-
ments" included the request that UNRRA recruit and lend, fqr service 
within Chinese governmental agencies, a total of more than 2,250 experts. 
Of ' this number twenty~two were . requested for work in flooded areas and 
230 for welfare and training. An .undetermined number would serve or ·wo,rk 
on tl'ansportation,_ and assist in the disp].ace'd per.son$ program. Such a 
· request .met, at .first 1with a cautiou_s response at ,the Washington Head-
. quarters. Ultima. tely, however, _ ~ashington arranged. to_. recr:ui t . the needed 
• "program personnel.tr This request led to one · of ·the largest and most 
. difficult recruiting ope.rations which' faced UNBRA• From the start. it was 
:realized that to. obtain satisfactory, and not infrequently, highly 
. . .. 11 
specialized personnel would be difficult. 
Operations as difficult .and specialized as. thos.e · carried out in 
China called for the institution ·of a special training program ·for those 
individuals·einployed for'the China field. Likethe program of recruit-
ment, the training program-embraced. both the personnel assigned to UNRRA's 
China.offi.ce as well as persons who worked with CNRRA in various techni-
cal and advisory ·capacities. F.or those persons :recruited specifically 
for China, .a.brief'but intensive orientation to lJNRRAand Chinese relief 
. problems. s~ved to familiarize the personnel ydth their· expected act,i:vi-
ties. 
The UN;R.];1.A Training Branch established the UNRRA Training Center on 
the campus.of 'the University of Maryland, College Park, May,11 1944. From 
September to Decembe:r, 1945, the school was conducted exclusively for 
. . •., 
·th9se·employees. of·UNRRA designated for overseas assignment.in China. As 
the size of'the'body of':recruits for·China exceeded the'numbers which 
eould be trained at the University, it was necessa.:cy- to .move some-members 
11Woodbridge, UNRRA; II, P• 359. 
into Washington to continue the program. During D.ecember,. 1945, .adequate 
accommodations were found in Washington, D. Ci, to house the Center as 
one unit again. Members going to. missions other than 'China we.re housed 
in the· new quarters also, and special programs were conducted by the 
. 12. 
Training Center·staff for them • 
. The Training Center offered two· or three weeks, and sometimes as 
many.as·eight weeks, of intense instructions given bya staff of special-
ists in Chinese affairs, designed to make fullest. utilization of the 
short period involved. Stress centered on providing an understanding of 
·the basic social, political, and economic instructions of· China and the 
pos,ition of the Chinese governmental agencies in relationship to the 
goals of UNRRA for China. A brief introduction to the Chinese language, 
with emphasis on the lea:rningof words and phrases of maximum utility, 
. was given by the Chine·se instructors. 
The UNRRA Training Center concluded its operations after two years 
of operations.on April 30, 1946. During its period of operation the 
school prepared 2,585 persons of.thirty-eight different nationalities 
for relief and rehabilitation activities in twenty-three. countries. The 
training was organized and instruction proyided by a relatively small 
international staff. Never more than four fµll time professional persons 
gave instructions at the school at any one given time. Executives from 
UNB.:R,A. Headquarters selected the staff for the school and it consisted of 
12 
· United lifations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Monthly 
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officials from the diplomatic c.orps and federal services, and also, a 
carefully selected group of' outside experts. Many distinguished guest 
speakers and visitors,contributed to the general program. Included 
among the selected personalities could be found ambassadors, delegates 
to the UNRRA Council, outstanding journalists, United States Congressmen, 
and such ,experts.as Eleanor Roosevelt, Owen Lattimore., Colonel James 
Boettiger, James Brunot, Henry Cassidy, Vera .Michales., and scores of' 
others.13 
The Training Center operated as one.of the three sections of the 
·Training Branch o,f UNRRA; the other two .centers were located in Fin.gland 
and France. Persons of four nationalisties .directed the United States 
branch during.its brief'history. The school· opened under the leadership 
of Dr. Frank Munk, a noted Czech economist. who later oecame Director of' 
Training. Dr. Munk, Dr. Hertha Kraus, and Mr. l3ryn Mawr,.gave mµch of 
the instruc'f;.i.ons d:LJ.ring.the center's formative period. Bryn Mawr, a 
professor and an-authority on international:.relief, served as a part-
time .. instructor throughout. the two years. operation period. In the fall 
of 1944, Dr. Harry Cassidy (not.related to Henry Cassidy)., .Director of 
'Training and a Canadian ·social welfare expert, assumed the leadership. 
He was followed in ~y, 1945, by Bertram Pichard, a prominent English 
Quaker who had been for many years the director of 'the Friends' Center 
in Geneva;· later Dr. Cassidy became the chairman·of 'the Committee on 
13United Nations· Eelief and Rehaqilitation Administration, Monthly 
UNREA Revi., XX1 (May, 1946), P• 27. 
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Refugees and Displaced Persons of'the United Nations. Also, for a brief 
period, Pierce Williams, a United States Governrne_nt executive and adult 
educator, headed the Training Center .. Then finally, with the inaugura-
tion of·the prdgram for China in September, 1945, a prominent United 
States sociologist of Yenching and Temple Universities, Dr •.. J .. Stewart 
Burgess, assumed the administration of the center.14 
Bymid-1945, as previously mentioned, UNRRA had only a skeleton 
staff in China aiding·the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration. The relations between CNRRA and the China office of 
UNRRA were during this early period of active operations marred by dis-
agreement!3,:.mostly minor in nature, by inefficiency, and by a great deal 
of-friction. Both fractions were confronted with :u.rgent demands from 
·many sources. Such problems as the piling up of UNRRA supplies in the 
Chinese ports without adequate organization, lack of transportation 
facilities,. or proper funtis for · distribution, . and many marked diver-
gences in.the structure and. ope::ratic:mal .concepts held.by :the·:two. 
groups took time to work out.15 
Under such circumstances, consultation, joint planning, nor ef-
fective,coordination could be readily achieved. However, the strengthen- -
ing __ of CNRRA and other agencies· of' the Chinese Government resolved many 
of the dif'.f'erences .. In this area, the loans of UNRBA personnel to key 
14Ibid .. , p~ 27., 
15 6 Wo©dbridge, UNRRA, ll.!i P• 37 • 
q9 
. agencies of the government played a significant pa:rt; also, by: the :es ..... 
tablishment .of joint. committees on allocations and supply operations and,'· 
by improving liaison between corresponding function.al units of·the two 
organizations, .as .well as by increasing· effect.ive · consultation and co-
operation at all levels, .the two groups w:e:re able to,wqrkmore effectively. 
Differences and issues continued throughout the period of operations; how-
ever, in a progressive measure they were dealt with through a more frank 
discussion which led in most ,cases to agreement. and coordinated e.f'--
16 fort. 
By this time, mid.,...1945, a minimum amount of medical supplies, as 
well as seeds, had been shipped to Chungking. Medical and welfare· re-
.cruitment·had started, and the personnel employed in turn trained Chinese 
personnel in the field. By late 1946 a number of medical and public 
· health experts had arrived at the training ·centers in China and had 
started tra:inll.g ·.the native Chinese in the fields of public health, 
sanitary.engineering, and nursing. Also, by this time a training program 
for Chinese welfare workers had been put .into operation. In· .July, 1945, 
UNRRA had agre.ed to sponsor the t.raining . of· twelve na tiv:e welfare exp.e::rts 
who wished to pursue additional study in the United States on relief and 
rehabilitation problems.17 In addition., the United States Federal Govern-
ment .· cooperated With CNRRA in a project· of recruiting .a:nd training some 
16Ibid., P• 376. 
17UNRRA,: Report .2£ the Director General 2.£ the Council (For the 
Period· 1 July· 1945 to 30 Septembe:r 1945), P•. 54. 
sixty Ghinese·welfare wo):'kers who at this ·time resided in.~;h.eUnited 
'\ 
....'.States •. ~-.UNRRA Heac;iquarters met a req1:7-est. of CNRRA by providing the 
supplies required for _the, establishing of five· training. centers in China, 
for the t:rainingof local pe;rsonnel who were. used in-relief operations.18 
Shipment of· health -and .welfare· training supplies and· eqUipment had 
started .. a..t,.;t,his.time. Also, the UNRI,?.A China Headqua:rters in Shanghai 
with ·a liaison· office in Nabking had been established, with some .fifteen 
regional.offices scattered throughoµt the-country. Ma.ny_UNRRA welfare 
specialists ,served as advisers to the Chinese Government and various 
CNR.BA connnittee officials. 
A-major problem which UNfil!A Headquarters in Washington had to face 
in.volved. g..etting personnel to China. Personnel leaving from the United 
Stateshadto fit into theentry quotas established by the military 
. authorities.in China. The· oooperative.·reJations whi-eh·existed between 
JJNB.RA.· and mil:i:.tar.y.auth9rities in China 1>roved to be of· the utmost 
valu,einfaail;itating.:rirovementof·UNRRA representatives into China and 
in at.taining the travel necessary. in carrying out their·duties. The 
assista_nce of ·military authorities, who controlled the principal air 
routes in.China, continued to be essential to.the e,xpansion·of DNRRA's 
progr.am.-;dl'r.ring th~ post-s1U"render period.19 
Du.ring the · op.e'l'at,i ve period of UNRRA in China, . both the·. Washing-
ton ·and China Headquarte-rs- made little or no .e;t'fort to ·control the 
18lbid., P• 54. 
19tbid.,, p .• 53. 
activities of·the professional and religious voluntary agencies opera-
ting within the ··.country. The · entire responsibility for · determining the 
nature of ·relief., scope., and areas of operation of all voluntary 
agencies resuli:;ed from the "Principles of Cooperation among CNRRA.1 UNRRA,11 
and Foreign :Voluntary Agencies.," which placed this responsibility in the 
20 hands of CNRRA in June, 19459 
Action had to be taken by these foreign voluntary.agencies., to·en-
. su:t'e that the progress of internal reconstruction in China would not, in 
any way, be blocked by fears and jealousies., and that each of the -agencies 
could develop its own program in keeping with the genius of its people. 
This factor is especi~lly true in Eastern Asia., namely Chin.a., becaus~ of· 
the wide dis.parity between the social values cherished by orientals and 
occidentals .. Great differences can be found in the fields of family 
relati.ons, manual labor., and attitude concerning races. Chiang Kai-shek 
had ex.pressed the opinion several times during the war that the United 
Stat.es.and England loo~ed upon the Chinese as an inferior peopl!=)'" Thus, 
the :relati.ons.between China and her allies dared not be that between 
dol':lor .. and_;rec.ipient~ · The. ·views of the Chinese ~aders had to be heard 
with respect. They needed the recognition as equals in regard to the 
pa.rt which the Western Powers gave them. The acceptance of aid from 
the west in general could only be interpreted as a sign of strength, 
and not one of humiliation., After nine years of war and blockade., the 
Chinese people needed all the help they could get to feed.the starving 
20 
Woodbridge., UNRRA.; II~ .p. 71. 
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and clothe the· naked. The relief needs proved to be as great, and in 
many ·cases greater, in Free China with its impaired economy than it had 
been in the formerly occupied regions. The task proved not necessarily 
one of supplying from abroad the relief supplies and other lacking 
materials, but . of restoration of productive capacity which would enable 
the people to produce what they needed. 
During the Second World War ·many American churches, working through 
the Church Committee on Overseas Relief and Reconstruction, sent such aid 
as possible. But the American Protestant churches relied for adminis-
t t . h 1 . t f · · d 1 · · · 2l ra ive e p on -a varie yo recognize re igious agencies. Chief 
among the agencies through which relief was channeled, however, was the 
Ch:urch Committee for Relief ·in Asia, which had grown out of the former 
Church Committee for China Relief.22 
The Protestant missionaries had, .for over a centur;y, been ·steadily 
expanding :their work in China before ·the ·coming of UNRRA.- By the late 
1920's, the leadership p~eviously held by foreign missionaries had 
largely_pa.ssed into the ·hands of the native Christians. During the 
Second World W~r the Chinese Christians contributed greatly to the 
21such as the American Bible Society, the .American Fr~nds Service 
Committee, the Orphaned Missions Fund of the International Missionary 
Council, the Young Men's Christian Association (war-prisoner's aid and 
chaplaincy · seri'ice), the Young Women's Christian Association, the 
World!s Student Christian Federation, .and the American Christian Com-
mittee for Refugees. 
2
~A~ L. Warnshuis, "Bow the Churches Can Help," Social Action, 
IlI (November, ·1946)., PP• .3Qi-31. 
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nation's·war ·effort and .civilian .relief. Innnediatel:y. after the close 
··. . ' ' . . . 
o,f the war, both native Christians and foreign missionaries engaged ex-
:·. 
tensively :in the relief and rehabilita.tion aQti:vities. Like the Cathe-
lie missionaries, the Protestant missionaries could credit themselves 
with ·the establishment of many educational an<i medical institutions. in 
China, in addition to the activities of direct relief rendered. The 
·end of'the·war found the work of the missionaries greatly disrupted, 
but in spite o.f.: the many difficulties, the religious• bodies manifested 
remarkable · endurance and growth, both in membership and the rendering of 
humane services.2.3 
' Protestant gro.ups WO!C'king in China based their relief plans for 
the wa;r-.shatt.ered country and ope-rated on the as,aum.ption that the peak 
of suffering.and relief needs resulting from the·wa,r would be passed be-
fore 1948. This projected assumption, however, tragically underestimated 
bot.h the depth and the . ext.ent of· damages ~thin China, 1 s resulting from 
I 
the,war and the·abilo~l conditions existing at the cloie of Japanese 
! 
occupation. Withthe surrender of.Japan, all of occupied China was li-
berated at once; this sudden and total liberation left the country in a 
state oi' confusion and distress much worse than that experienced by most 
European countrie.s. Soon thereafter, P:c-otestant missionary leaders 
realized that a return to conditi-0ns even remotely: resemb,ling those ex-
isting before the catastrophe could not be· expected for a least a 
/ 
. 
23The · China Handbook Editorial Board,. China Handbook :19.52-1953, 
(Taipei,. Taiwan:i China Publishing·Company, 1952), PP• ·52 ... 5;,. 
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generatio~. even under the most desirable condit~ons. This realization 
resulted in a re-evaluation of the consideration given to future activi-
ties on the part of Protestant missionary leaders in regards to relief 
policies. It was realized that a united program projected over a long 
range in which immediate physical, as well as spiritual, aid had to be 
the primary concern. Cooperative efforts on the part of the Christian 
missionaries in China concerning relief, during both naturalJand un-
natural disasters, were not new. The history of the foreign missionaries 
in China cove!'a .·· a period o;f several decadee .,of administering aid to 
those among whom they labored and lived. 
The Catholic missionaries were among the first foreigners to work 
among tha tChinese. During the war the Chinese Cath0lic Medical Service, 
founded in Chungking during 1937, at the suggestion of Archbishop Paul 
Yu-pin, distributed medical aid, medical supplies, and relief to orphan-
agesand dispensaries in the unoccupied sections of China. This organ-
_; zati on continued to function until early 1946, with its main source of 
·revenue coming_.from the American Catholic organization known as the War 
Relie.f .Services. After the disbanding of the Chinese Catholic Medical 
SerYice, the Catholic Welfare Committe€ established during July, 1946, 
in Shanghai, served as a central agency for the 288 hospitals, 866 dis-
pensaries, and 320 orphanages maintained by the Catholic Church in 
China. The Catholic Welfare Committee cooperated with other relief 
agencies through its eight regional directors. 24 
24The China Handbook Editorial Board, China Handbook 122.Q, (New 
York: Rockport Press, Inc., 1950), P• 28. 
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Other :relief work carried on by the Catholic agency included the 
training of child w-elfare pe-rsonnel, in conjunction with the Aurora 
College for Women in Shanghai, and maintaining·a mobile children's 
clinic in the same city. Additionall;r, the Catholic missions conducted 
eight leper hospitals in China.25 
Following the war, the Protestant mission hospitals faced great 
rehabilitation difficulties. Shortages of medical supplies, medical 
equipment, and trained personnel added to their already numerous problems. 
On March 21 and 22, 1945, Dr. Sze Sz$-IhmI:):g, chief of the Far Eastern 
section Health Division, attended in New York a meeting called by the 
Foreign Missions Conference of North America. Its purpose·centered on 
discussion of participation of Protestant mission hospitals in the re-
lief and :rehahilitation program of CNRRA. The conference group, con.,.. 
sisting __ of representatives of the missionary societies of the United 
States and Canada, approved and urged future cooperation between the 
missionary· societies and CNRB.A; it also recommended placing the various 
societies'hospital buildings in China at the disposal of Chinese au-
thorities. In addition, the .,conference representatives endorsed the 
proposal of sending back to China whateve-r technical personnel the 
various societies might have available to staff the hospitals; the gro,ip 
also urged that the missionary- societies station a full-time medical 
representative in Chungking_to act as a liaison officer, whose duties 
25 8 lbid., P• 2. 
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·would be to determine which mission hospitals should be reopened for 
maximum effectness to the relief effort and how mission personnel could 
be best utilized.26 
The National Christian Council established and maintained a relief 
corrmlittee in Chi..r:ia during 1946 and 1947, and from March, 1946, to the 
following March, the National Council spent in administering for general 
relief and aid to church workers a sum of CNR $1,153 million; the aid 
given to church workers included the tuition for minister's children 
and subsidies given to theolegy students~ The source of income .for 
work carried on by the National Christian Council came primarily from 
the Church World Service, New York, and was channelled through China. 
The National Christian Council terminated its work on September 30, 1947, 
and the Protestant Service Department of the American Advisory Committee 
took up its relief activities.27 
During mid-1945, a movement was set afoot to merge the Church Com-
mittee on Overseas Relief and Reconstruction, the Church Committee for 
Relief in Asia, and the Commission for World Council Service., which con-
cerned itself primarily with interchurch aid in Europe. This Church 
World Service, Incorporated, the resulting organization of the merger, 
held its first meeting in May, 1946~ The organization described itself 
as not another separate relief agency, but as the churches themselves 
working together. The funds and goods contributed by the American 
-l 
~;:)United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Monthly 
1JNFl1~4. Review, VIII (April, 1945), P@ 11. 
27n1e China Handb0ok Editorial Board, China Handbook, lli.Q, p. 30. 
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churches wer.e administered almost together by the local church and 
mission personnel in the countries receiving.aid, rathe.r than by the 
religious.relief agencies in those countries.28 
The Church World Service, Inc., purchased powdered milk and other 
·Concentrated foods at wholesale prices and shipped them overseas in 
· b'ltlk:quantities. Clothing, shoes, layettes, bedding arid other house-
hold. items and supplies were greatly needed in China, wh~e textiles 
were not yet available for· manufacturing and where the people · could not 
obtain. theee neceseities. To aid in fighting the misery of cold and ex-
po~iJ.te, the American·churches asked their various congregations for 
·used clothing. The member churches united in opening ten warehouses 
under Chn~ch World ·Service;. lnc. Most of the work of sorting, packing, 
and shipping t.he clothing was done by volunteers. Churches located .near 
the ten warehouses sponsored salvage sewing groups which helped in 
mending.the used garments, which.resulted in the most economical relief 
i 
·program ever,conceived. Gifts-d.n-Kind ·received at the ~rehouses were 
· 29 credited to the donor's hdm.e church • 
.. channelle~. $1,000 ,.090 'i'h glf~s .:from . d.~diV.iduals ... of·_ the. Congrega·tio:na 1, 
,Cll:ristian.··miu:rche.s .. tO.;J:'elie.r.::iieedS:- in'.;.;Elng].p.nd; Fra:n'.ce, ,Italy, Gr13e'ce/,:-- ~·, · 
and ·chfoft_-. :.This:~a.mount,.c9mpriaed.:the Congr.egational"Chrfstian· Churches' 
28 
:Wa.rnshµ.is,- "How the Churches Can Help," P• 31. 
share· m which all demoninations united during this period to send 
$10,000,000·,to··war vict:uns· oversea.s.30 
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The ·Congregational Christian Eelief · Committee changed its name to 
the Committee forWa.r,Vict:uns andEeconstruction; it sought beforethe 
close of 194,8 to raise a minimum of $4.,0()Q.,OOO,as its share of 
$125,000,000 sought by Protestant denominations. in the Unit,ed States for 
· relief purposes and for the -reconstr11ction- of church· life around the 
world. A total of $1,294,,000 of this amount was needed for the recon-
. struction of church property, such, as hospitals,. schools, .. and churches 
overseas~ The essential nature of s:uch a. program m the 'l'ehabilitation 
of war· victims can be seen m many ways; for· example, the fa·ct t}:ia.t 
eighty pe:r · cent of all civilian hospital;· b.edsc::in.) Cbdin.a::;w:erec-.imi,Ch:i?istian 
institutions, and of the 250 hospitals supplymg these beds, nearly all 
were either destroyed or stripped of their equipment during the war • .31 
The B:r-ethren Service Committee of the Chu;rch of the Brethren· not 
only made· a substantial contribution to UNR~ through its livestock 
program, but engaged m a new type of humanitarian service which proved 
most bepeficial in China. Through the efforts of this religious organi-
zation., American ·.farnrlng methods and mechanized farming equipment. were 
mt.reduced mto China by the Brethren agricultural missionaries. 
The agricultural missionaries· consisted of a. ;f'i.:f'ty man tractor.-
30HawleyWilliam., "The Congregational Christian Program of Re-
construction.,ff Social Action., XII (November, 194.6), P• 37. 
31Ibid,.., PP•· 37-38. 
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operator unit sponsored by UNRRA and the Chu.n:-ch of the Brethren. The 
members of the·team·underwent.a two .... week course.at·the Harry Ferguson, 
Inc., Educational Fa;r-m near Ypsilanti, Michigan. B;ere they lear'ned to 
tear ·down· and :reassemble· tractors and farm. implements and perform actual 
.32 
fat'lll W<Dl:'k• 
The idea for the "down ... toHearth" ambassadors. o;r-igina ted with 
Howard Sollenberger, the son of American missionaries to China. When 
UNRRA decided to send American·tractors and implements to the Yellow 
River area to help solve China's food problem~ M;r. Sollenberger's idea 
met with· approval and adoption by both the Brethren and UNRRA, which 
ordered an '3l'Ilergency shipment of·2,000 tractors and farm implements. 
UNRRA f.inanced .th,e cost of ·transportation, •. while CNRRA contributed $15 
per month and maintenance for each of.the lfdown-to-ea:rth" ambassado,rs. 
The worker .... missionarli.es left the·Un;ited·States in Septembe.r, 1948, with 
a contract. calling for eighteen months .of service • .33 Tra.ctor--training 
bases.and t,racto;r .... plowing projects were set up in Honan, Hupei, Hunan, 
Kwangsi, Kiangsi, Shantung, .. Chekiang and Northeast China; the bas.es were 
located in areas where arable land had been out of cultivation for some 
time. Thousands of acres were planted which otherwise would have :re-
mained idle. Mµchof this land had been. reclaimed after the completion 
32united Nations Relief and Rehabilitation· Administration,. Monthly 
UNRRA Review, XXVI (October, 1946), P• 25; From an account which appeared 
in the. Wall Street Journal of· 27 August 1946. 
JJibid., P• 25« 
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of the Yellow River Project .34 The men, in addition to work done in the 
field, aided in teaching at two agricultural schools which· had been es-
tabli.shed earlier in the year. Some of the men indicated that they ex-
pected to· rema.in in China after their· cont.racts expired as full time 
.missionaries. 
Perhaps this was one· of ·the most practi.cal projects on the part 
of American religious organizations. China has neve'I' been able to pro-
videenough-foodfrom her·domestic agriculture to feed the masses of her 
people. Sh.e has always:·been dependent upon food imports. The devasta-
tion of nearly fourteen years of war, especially the breaking of the 
Yellow Rivel' dikes and'the,consequent flooding o.£ a large area of good 
.agricultural.land, widened ehbrm.ously the gap between needs and domestic 
prod1rction. 
34tmRRA, Report of ~ Director General i£ the Council (For the 
Period 1 July 1947 to 31 'December· 1947 and Summary of· Operations 9 
November 19.43 ·to December 1947) (Washington, D~Coc, 1948), P• 235. 
EVALUATION 
DNRRA can list many triumphs in China,. mm.RA probably saved two 
totnree milllon,destitute people from starvation. In addition, at 
.least eight to ten million·more received UNRRA ,food,, clothing, or medi-
cal supplies to tide them over. Finally lJ.NRRA created s9me two million 
jobs through its· various work projects; and wages distributed enabled 
many··to·· readjust to postwa:r- China. 
Aside f:r:-om meeting human needs, UNRRA left a material legacy of 
consequence. It constructed or repaired .several thousand ,miles of high-
ways and railway roadbeds. lt started, and in s,ome cases, eompilieted 
many sanitation projects, .river,dredging projects, and dams. The eight 
large, as well as many small cons:erYancy projects ,we3re. completed or 
· started. Many small ,local businesses and industries. started operations 
again as a result,. of UNRRA.,. . Further, tJNRRA restored fow miUion acres 
of land to. produ~:ti vity,. in turn protecting about thirty million· acres. 
Chinese medical and health institutions., as, a. :result, of UNRRA1 :re~ 
covered their prewar positions; and they had madea major breakthro:ugh on 
anti,..epid.emic work. , Wol'k :restored food output to prewa;i:- levels at a cost 
of $71,000,000. Esi;,:imates show that the annual food production from· land 
reclaimed through the conservancy projects c;lone was about four times the 
total amopnt of·· foodstuff provided by UNRRA and a bout thirty--seven times 
81 
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the amount, used in feeding ·the.• worke:rs. in. carrying . out.: the proj eots. 1 
O~her pos)itive benefits brought to the Chinese people as a re-
- sult of 'ON~· a.c1,ivities · in.eluded power plants. ,nd wate:rworks · projects, 
aid .to :eQal l?lilling, the machine shop industry, and the textile . industry. 
Likewise it ,i.Jnproved .coastal. and, river· shipping and highway transporta--
t,ion· i'a.ciliti,es. Finally UN:rm.A supplies did eria.ble China to. scrape 
through thee postwar p~~iod' ;c-elatively free. from' starvation. 
· !f China niade. a slow. recove:ry, under .UNRRA. auspicies, this. re-
sulted from factors beyond the·organization's·control. Without UNRRA 
aid., .mjlJj ons of Chinese would surely ·have .starved. 
1./"!,.. t•T?.TD'O A ' i'm... . . ' th 
~.orge J\Toodcbridge, v,1.~~. ·~. Hist.cry . .Q! .~. U.nit.ed. Nations .Relief 
and Reha.bilitat.ion Administration (New York: Coluin.bia Universit.Y'.' Press1' 
. 19:50, _ three· voium.es),_ !I; P• :1+,2. . ., 
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